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THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE LAW OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
 
Matthew T. Bodie* 
 
 
Abstract: 
This article looks at twelve of the Roberts Court's labor and 
employment law cases through the lens of human resources.  The rise 
of HR departments parallels the increase in the myriad statutory and 
regulatory requirements that govern the workplace.  The Supreme 
Court's decisions in labor and employment law cases are largely 
monitored and implemented by HR professionals who must carry out 
these directives on a daily basis.  In adopting an approach that is 
solicitous towards human resources, the Roberts Court reflects a 
willingness to empower these private institutional players.  Even if 
labor and employment law scholars do not agree with the 
solicitousness, they should use the opportunity to develop a positive 
theory of HR, one that directs this workforce in a just and ethical 
manner. 
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“People make mistakes.  Even administrators of ERISA plans.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Most of the sturm and drang in employment law involves issues 
related to litigation.  In particular, issues of procedure—motions to 
dismiss, summary judgment, pleading standards, and class actions—
take up much of the intellectual space within the field.  For example, 
in the employment discrimination context, the most prominent cases 
concern the burdens of production and persuasion,2 the standards for 
mixed motive evidence,3 and the availability of punitive damages and 
attorney’s fees.4  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 focused almost entirely 
on litigation-related concerns, much of it in response to prior Supreme 
Court decisions;5 similarly, the recent amendments to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act are also litigation-oriented.6    And perhaps the 
most important employment discrimination case of the decade 
concerned the certification of a class of employees.7  In the ERISA 
                                                          
1 Conkwright v. Frommert, 130 S.Ct. 1640, 1644 (2010). 
2 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
3 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
4 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (setting forth the test for 
punitive damages).   
5 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (providing for jury 
trials, compensatory damages, and a different litigation standard for disparate 
impact cases). See also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: 
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 530 (2003) (arguing that the 1991 Act 
“explicitly rejected” the Court’s decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 
U.S. 642 (1989)). 
6 Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 
(2008) (discussing how definitional changes will change the litigation landscape). 
7 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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context, much of the case law concerns the standards of review8 and 
the availability of certain causes of action.9  And all of the fencing back 
and forth about employment arbitration is largely about procedure-
related issues such as class actions10 and the scope of arbitral review.11 
 Of course, for all this focus on litigation, most employment 
disputes never go to trial.12  But beyond the formally settled claims lies 
an unknown but likely vast number of employment-related disputes 
that are never even filed.  In order to deal with these disputes, as well 
as to manage the employment relationship more generally, most large 
employers rely on human resource professionals.13  Human resources – 
or “HR” – is the term for the business function tasked with handling 
the myriad issues that arise from the dealings between employees, 
supervisors, management, and the firm.  Although the term “human 
resources” dates from the 1960s, it is based on a tradition of employee 
management dating back to the industrial revolution.14  HR 
departments are tasked with managing the details of the employment 
relationship: recruitment, hiring, compensation, benefit management, 
training, and dispute resolution.15  Ever increasingly, the job of the HR 
professional is to manage legal compliance within these areas. 
                                                          
8 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
9 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008). 
10 ATT Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
11 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct.2772 (2010). 
12 It is well established that most employment claims that are filed nevertheless 
settle out of court.  See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 
440 (2004) (stating that almost 70% of employment discrimination cases settle out of 
court); Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential 
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 135 (finding 
that in a dataset of 472 employment discrimination cases before a federal magistrate 
judge, settlement was reached prior to the making of a dispositive motion in 87% of 
the cases).   
13 See DAVID J. CHERRINGTON, THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 5 (4th ed. 
1995) (“Most companies with over 300 employees have a human resource manager”). 
14 Sandford M. Jacoby, A Century of Human Resources Management, in INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS TO HUMAN RESOURCES AND BEYOND: THE EVOLVING PROCESS OF 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS MANAGEMENT 147, 148 (Bruce E. Kaufman, Richard A. 
Beumont & Roy B. Helfgott eds., 2003). 
15 See, e.g., SHAWN SMITH & REBECCA MAZIN, THE HR ANSWER BOOK: AN 
INDISPENSABLE GUIDE FOR MANAGERS AND HUMAN RESOURCES PROFESSIONALS xi-xii 
(2004). 
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HR employees often have a bad reputation for enforcing needless 
rules, focusing on trivial matters, and having a vindictive streak 
against their fellow employees.16  However, looking at its small but 
important pool of labor and employment decisions, the Supreme Court 
under Chief Justice John Roberts has shown a special solicitude for HR 
departments.  The Roberts Court has recognized that most of the 
employment law dramas play out in the private sector well short of 
litigation.  Given the number of employees, and the expanding legal 
standards for employees set down by employment law, it would be 
impossible for courts to resolve these disputes en masse.  As a result, 
private actors must be counted up to do the ground-floor work of 
addressing workplace compliance.  Thus, the Court may be looking to 
enlist and empower this powerful wing of human resources 
professionals to manage workplace issues more quickly and effectively. 
In so doing, the Court is following the general trend of 
privatization and governance reform that is alive and well in 
employment law.  Although most employment law remains regulatory 
in nature, scholars and practitioners have increasingly pointed to 
public-private partnerships, as well as so-called self-regulation, to help 
overcome the enforcement gap in employment law.17  A self-governance 
approach has most obviously been used in the OSHA context, where 
the law specifically accommodates private compliance mechanisms.18  
But self-governance approaches, coming in many shapes and sizes, 
                                                          
16 See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Studying Labor Law and Human Resources in Rhode 
Island, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 384, 384 (2002) ("Human-relations 
professionals are sometimes said to be hypocrites giving a fake smile to employees 
while looking solely at the bottom line."); Keith H. Hammonds, Why We Hate HR, 
FAST COMPANY, Aug. 1, 2005, at: 
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/97/open_hr.html (“Why are annual 
performance appraisals so time-consuming -- and so routinely useless? Why is HR so 
often a henchman for the chief financial officer, finding ever-more ingenious ways to 
cut benefits and hack at payroll? Why do its communications -- when we can 
understand them at all -- so often flout reality? Why are so many people processes 
duplicative and wasteful, creating a forest of paperwork for every minor transaction? 
And why does HR insist on sameness as a proxy for equity?”). 
17 See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 342 (2004). 
18 Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of 
Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1104-15 (2005) (describing OSHA’s new 
governance regulatory programs). 
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have spread across the employment landscape.  They generally seek to 
pair private efforts to enforce the law with some system of 
accountability, whether through reconfigured governmental scrutiny or 
non-governmental third parties, such as NGOs or unions.  The critical 
question about these efforts is where they fall on the spectrum: are 
they meaningful efforts that lead to greater compliance, or are they 
merely window dressing?  The Roberts Court has demonstrated more 
comfort with a traditional form of private regulation: namely, internal 
enforcement by HR and compliance departments.  By enlisting private 
compliance actors, the Court is looking to leverage its authority across 
a much wider set of firms than would be possible with a litigation 
focus.  Through its holdings, its inferences, and its dicta, the Court can 
move these departments to enforce the law at the front lines, well 
before outside counsel must be called in.  Litigation fades into the 
background.  It becomes the shadow in which the actual stuff of 
employment law takes place.19 
Of course, it is impossible to know what the Supreme Court – an 
assemblage of nine20 individuals – actually intend with their slate of 
opinions, beyond what those opinions themselves say.  But looking at 
the areas of employment discrimination, retaliation, privacy, and 
ERISA, I contend that the Roberts Court has focused more on the role 
of human resources departments than on the role of litigation in 
enforcing the employment laws.  The Court’s decisions have not been 
uniformly pro-defendant, but they have been fairly uniform in 
promoting the importance of HR professionals and other private 
compliance actors in managing the enforcement of the law.  This 
concern for private compliance cuts across the other labels, such as 
judicially modest or conservative or pro-business, that have been 
applied to the Roberts Court. 
 Moreover, these decisions call into questions our notions about 
the political economy of employment law.  In the area of criminal 
justice, scholars such as William Stuntz and Eric Miller have 
questioned the resource allocation driven by traditional Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence; instead of focusing on rights, they argue (to 
                                                          
19 Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).  
20 The Roberts Court is actually eleven justices: the current nine justices (Chief 
Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Ginsburg, Alito, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan), as well as former Justices Souter & Stevens. 
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paraphrase them bluntly), we should focus on cops.21  The Roberts 
Court’s employment law decisions counsel for a similar reorientation of 
perspective: instead of focusing on employment law rights, we should 
focus on HR professionals.  Like cops on the beat, human resources 
departments can address problems at a grass-roots level.  And if we 
assume their bad faith, we miss the opportunity to enlist them in the 
fight. 
 This Article will describe the Supreme Court’s focus on human 
resources and inquire as to how even progressive employment law 
scholars can engage with this focus in a way that will improve the lives 
of workers.  Part I of the Article provides a background on HR 
management as a field and explains its role in the workplace today.  
Part II discusses how the Court has crafted its employment law 
decisions in the areas of discrimination, retaliation, privacy, and 
ERISA towards the HR departments that have the front-line 
responsibilities for administering these laws.  Finally, Part III will 
discuss how the political economy of workplace regulation should be 
driving all participants—even progressive employment law scholars—
to envision how to enlist HR managers and employees to carry out the 
dictates of employment law in their everyday work. 
I. LAW AND THE RISE OF HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
 
The law is not unfamiliar to the world of the workplace.  Prior to 
the New Deal, agency and contract law dictated the terms of the 
employment relationship, which changed from primarily year-long 
contracts during Blackstone’s era into the “at-will” rule during the late 
19th Century.22  Federal law then imposed its own framework with 
statutory schemes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),23 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),24 Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
                                                          
21 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 780 (2006); Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court's Regulatory Revolution in 
Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
22 For a discussion of how the at-will rule developed from an early misapprehension 
of the actual state of the law, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the 
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). 
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. (2006) 
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Rights Act,25 the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),26 and 
the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA).27  States 
have piggy-backed off these regimes in some areas, such as 
antidiscrimination protections;28 they have also partnered with the 
federal government (for unemployment insurance)29 and have 
established their own unique protections (such as workers’ 
compensation).30  Thus, despite the at-will rule (or perhaps because of 
it),31 the workplace has become a very legally-intensive environment. 
In grappling with the study of the law of work, legal education 
has generally broken down this subject area into four distinct 
subsections: labor law, employment discrimination, employee benefits, 
and employment law.32  Labor law concerns the regulation of collective 
employee action, largely manifested though union representation.33  
Employment discrimination focuses on the federal antidiscrimination 
statutes, while employee benefits centers around the tax and benefits 
implications of ERISA.34  Finally, employment law focuses on the 
employment contract and a grab-bag of other regulatory provisions, 
including FLSA, OSHA, covenants not to compete, employee privacy, 
and workers compensation.35  These subjects are the lenses through 
which judges, law professors, and attorneys look at the workplace.   
                                                          
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (2006). 
27 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
and 29 U.S.C.). 
28 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2012) (setting forth unlawful 
discriminatory practices and protected classes); id. §§ 297-98 (reviewing the 
administrative and judicial processes for discrimination complaints). 
29 See Charles C. Kearns, State Implementation of the SUTA Dumping Prevention 
Act of 2004, 11 ST. & LOC. TAX LAW. 105, 107-08 (2006). 
30 See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, 
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004); Lawrence M. 
Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, in 
AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 279 
(Lawrence M. Freidman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978). 
31 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More With Less, 68 MD. L. 
REV. 89, 89-93 (2008) (arguing that the current regime of at-will plus exceptions 
should be replaced with a uniform and easier-to-administer rule based on just cause). 
32 See Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1539 
(2006). 
33 Id.   
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
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Perhaps not surprisingly, at least three of the four also 
represent somewhat distinct practice areas.  Labor law is the realm of 
union-side and management-side attorneys, as well as the network of 
government employees and private arbitrators that work to keep the 
collective bargaining machinery running.  However, with the 
percentage of union-represented workers continuing to shrink, this 
field is a much thinner version of its former self.36  In contrast, the 
growth in employment discrimination suits has spurred significant 
growth in the plaintiff and defense bar in this area.  Particularly 
important was the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which amped up the 
economic incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring discrimination 
actions.37  Employee benefits forms an expanding niche within tax 
departments.  Only employment law has failed to catch on as a unique 
subspecialty.  Some aspects of the “employment law” ubercategory, 
such as workers compensation, are attended to by a special set of 
lawyers.38  Others are subsumed into larger categories, such as 
business litigation or corporate law.  Plaintiff-side employment 
discrimination attorneys have begun to take off some pieces of 
employment law, such as FLSA wage and hour litigation.  Finally, 
some employment law matters, such as unemployment insurance 
claims, are largely handled pro se.   
Given that legal education is designed to educate attorneys, it is 
no surprise that the legal world has focused on the role of law and, 
more specifically, attorneys within the workplace.  However, as the 
role of law has expanded beyond its common-law parameters, the task 
of interacting with the law has too expanded beyond attorneys and 
litigation.  In fact, at the grass-roots level, human resources employees 
are much more likely to deal with day-to-day workplace legal issues 
                                                          
36 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002) (discussing the gradual but dramatic decrease in private-
sector union representation). 
37 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. 
L. REV. 277, 279 (noting that “[t]he 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
attracted to the practice of employment law a new generation of lawyers, who 
approach employment litigation like personal injury cases”). 
38 See, e.g., Marc J. Cairo, Five Things Every Lawyer Should Know About Workers’ 
Compensation Practice, CHICAGO BAR J. 50 , 51, April 2004 (“Traditionally, 
practitioners in this area of law have been few and attorneys from both sides of the 
bar know each other very well. The result is an adversarial but congenial 
community.”). 
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than are in-house counsels or outside law firms.  Human resources, 
training, and labor relations managers and specialists held about 
904,900 jobs in 2008.39  And the numbers are expected to grow.  As the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reports: 
 
Employment is expected to grow much faster than the 
average for all human resources, training, and labor 
relations managers and specialists occupations. . . . 
Overall employment is projected to grow by 22 percent 
between 2008 and 2018, much faster than the average for 
all occupations. Legislation and court rulings revising 
standards in various areas—occupational safety and 
health, equal employment opportunity, wages, healthcare, 
retirement plans, and family leave, among others—will 
increase demand for human resources, training, and labor 
relations experts. Rising healthcare costs and a growing 
number of healthcare coverage options should continue to 
spur demand for specialists to develop creative 
compensation and benefits packages that companies can 
offer prospective employees. Employment of labor 
relations staff, including arbitrators and mediators, 
should grow as companies attempt to resolve potentially 
costly labor-management disputes out of court. Additional 
job growth may stem from increasing demand for 
specialists in international human resources management 
and human resources information systems.40 
  
Thus, there now exists a large cadre of human resources employees 
who are tasked, in large part, with managing the relationship between 
the firm and its employees.  The Society for Human Resource 
Management (SHRM) boasts a global membership of over 250,000 and 
a staff of more than 350.41 
                                                          
39 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HUMAN RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND LABOR 
RELATIONS MANAGERS AND SPECIALISTS,” OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010-
11 ed., at: http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos021.htm.  
40 Id.  
41 Mission and History, Society for Human Resource Management, at: 
http://www.shrm.org/about/history/Pages/default.aspx.  
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Concomitant with this growth in employment opportunities, 
human resources management has developed into an academic and 
professional field of endeavor.42  The beginnings of human resources 
are frequently associated with the work of Frederick Taylor, who in the 
late 19th Century sought to bring “scientific management” to the 
industrial workplace.43  “Taylorism,” as his approach came to be called, 
involved breaking down workplace tasks into their smallest possible 
unit, and then creating rigorous protocols for these tasks so as to 
maximize efficiency.  Taylor intended for his system to eliminate 
conflict between workers and management by applying natural law to 
determine the “one best way” to address production issues.44  However, 
human resources might be better seen as a response to Taylorism—an 
effort to put the “human factor” back into focus.45  This focus—often 
paired with the monikers of “human relations” or “personnel 
management”—agreed with Taylor’s perspective that poor 
management practices were ultimately at fault for the rift between 
management and labor.46  Thus, it was the responsibility of 
management to develop programs and practices to address the 
workers’ needs.47  In contrast with the “rational actor” in economics, 
the field of personnel management used psychology to look at workers 
from a social perspective.48  The result was an outpouring of books and 
                                                          
42 As a recent president of the Society of Human Resource Management (SHRM) said, 
“Perhaps the greatest human resources accomplishment . . . has been the worldwide 
recognition that human resources management is, indeed, a profession with a clearly 
defined body of knowledge.”  Michael R. Losey, Mastering the Competencies of HR 
Management, 38 HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 99, 99-100 (1999). 
43 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An 
Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 983 (1998).  See also 
Frederick Taylor, A Piece Rate System, Being a Step toward Partial Solution of the 
Labor Problem, 16 TRANSACTIONS 856 (1895).  Taylor was perhaps the most 
prominent members of the “systematic management” movement between 1880 and 
1920.  Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 148. 
44 BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ORIGINS & EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD OF INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1993). 
45 Id. at 24; see also GORDON S. WATKINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LABOR 
PROBLEMS 476-77 (1922) (“The old scientific management failed because it was not 
founded upon a full appreciation of the importance of the human factor.  It was left to 
the new science of personnel management to discover and evaluate the human 
elements in production and distribution.”). 
46 KAUFMAN, supra note BK1993, at 25. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.   
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articles in the 1920s from psychologists and business practitioners 
about the needs and wants of the modern employee.49  At the same 
time, thousands of companies were setting up or expanding their 
employment management departments to take advantage of these 
developments.50 A new field was taking shape.51 
 As the ability of workers to organize collectively reached a 
crescendo in the 1930s, both through continued union growth and 
through federal protections such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act52 and 
the 1935 Wagner Act,53 the field of personnel management drew 
competition from an “institutional labor economics” (ILE) approach.54  
ILE advocates, found within the more general field of industrial 
relations, argued that collective bargaining was a crucial element to 
labor relations, and that management practices in and of themselves 
were not a sufficient solution.55  This led to what has been described as 
a “bifurcation” in the field of workplace management.56  Within 
academia, economics and, later, industrial relations departments 
offered courses in “labor problems” that primarily focused on collective 
bargaining.57  In contrast, business schools offered courses in personnel 
management that focused on such managerial tasks as recruitment, 
promotion, compensation, and training.58  In the field, labor relations 
specialists were now joining with existing personnel departments, and 
attorneys were often called in to negotiate and manage collective 
bargaining agreements. 
                                                          
49 Id.  Ordway Tead and Henry Metlcalf authored the first university textbook 
devoted to personnel management in 1920.  Bruce E. Kaufman, Evolution and 
Current Status of University HR Programs, 38 HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 103, 104 
(1999). 
50 Id. at 103.  See also Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 151 (“Between 1915 and 1920, 
the proportion of firms with more than 250 employees that had personnel 
departments increased from roughly 5 percent to about 25 percent.”). 
51 See id. (noting that the first national conference of personnel managers attracted 
five hundred attendees in 1917, and close to three thousand came In 1920). 
52 Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
53 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169). 
54 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 104. 
55 John R. Commons has been called the “exemplar” of the ILE approach.  See id.; 
JOHN R. COMMONS, INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL (1919); JOHN R. COMMONS, INDUSTRIAL 
GOVERNMENT (1921). 
56 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 104. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
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 From the post-World War II period up through the 1970s, labor 
relations and collective bargaining experts overshadowed their 
personnel management counterparts, particularly in academia.59  Over 
two dozen schools developed industrial relations programs or 
departments, with most of these focused on ILE rather than personnel 
management.60  In law, the labor law course was the only workplace-
oriented class, and was taught by well-known academics such as Derek 
Bok, Archibald Cox, and Clyde Summers.61  Personnel management 
courses remained in the curriculum of business schools, but they were 
generally not held in high regard.62  In particular, critics argued that 
personnel management had a thin foundation in theory and was 
almost vocational in its approach to its subject.63   
 At the same time, however, the field of human relations was 
booming in the workplace.  The American Society for Personnel 
Administration was founded in 1948 with only 28 original members; by 
1964, it had grown to over 3,000.  The Hawthorne experiments—
conducted at a Western Electric plant in the 1930s—were popularized 
in a 1941 Reader’s Digest article, and served as the basis for a new 
approach to the study of human relations.64  Over time, the field both 
fueled and was fueled by a relationship with the behavioral sciences, 
particularly organizational psychology.65  Academic research led to on-
the-job developments such as vertical job loading, sensitivity training, 
and the managerial grid.66  By the late 1960s, the academic focus of 
                                                          
59 Id. at 105.   
60 Id.   
61 See Bernard Dunau, Book Review: Labor Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems, 71 
COLUM. L. REV. 513 (1971) (discussing labor law casebooks, including those by Bok, 
Cox, and Summers). 
62 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 105.  The 1959 Gordon-Howell report on business 
schools was particularly scathing: “Next to the course on production, perhaps more 
educational sins have been committed in the name of personnel management than in 
any other required course in the business curriculum.”  ROBERT A. GORDON & JAMES 
E. HOWELL, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR BUSINESS 189 (1959). 
63 Fred K. Foulkes, The Expanding Role of the Personnel Function, 53 HARV. BUS. 
REV. 71, April 1975. 
64 See F.J. Roethlisberger, The Hawthorne Experiments, in CLASSICS OF PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT 16, 16-17 (Thomas H. Patten, Jr. ed., 1979). 
65 Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 158. 
66 Id.  
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human resources studies had moved from economics to psychology, and 
from a more theoretical focus to a much more applied perspective.67 
 Although collective bargaining remained the dominant 
workplace paradigm for academia well into the 1970s, the seeds of its 
downfall had been put in place by then.  Union density had begun its 
long, steady descent.  And the clutch of employment laws passed 
between 1964 and 1974 established the legal framework for an 
employment law, rather than a labor law, approach to workplace 
issues.68  As a result, the center of gravity for most workplace issues 
became HR departments, rather than the collective bargaining table or 
private contract.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, employers took up 
a variety of new approaches with zest: total quality management and 
quality of work life programs; participatory management; and diversity 
programs.69  At the same time, the shift to a finance and shareholder-
primacy focus within the boardroom forced HR departments to defend 
their positions by showing how good HR policies could increase firm 
value.70  The result was the growth of “strategic human resources 
management,” which seeks to identify ways in which HR can work 
with other business units to increase the firm’s overall business 
success.71 
The new focus on HR strategy explains in part why the field has 
remained firmly ensconced in business schools and is largely missing 
from legal academia.  Courses on HR or personnel management are 
now found in nearly every university with some type of business or 
management program.72  Despite some efforts to bring HR back into 
                                                          
67 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 106.  See also Mitchell Langbert, Professors, 
Managers, and Human Resource Education, 39 HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 65, 66 
(2000) (“Because HRM is interdisciplinary and practice-based, human resource 
professors tend to be practice-oriented.”). 
68 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 107. 
69 Id.; Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 164-67.   
70 Id. at 165. 
71 For an overview of strategic human resources management as an academic 
approach, see Christopher Mabey, Graeme Salaman & John Storey, Strategic Human 
Resource Management: The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory, in 
STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A READER (Christopher Mabey, Graeme 
Salaman & John Storey eds., 1998).  The core concept of strategic human resources 
management is that people management can be a “key source of sustained 
competitive advantage.”  Id.   
72 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 107-08.   
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the more theoretical realm of economics,73 the field as a whole remains 
immersed in organization behavior and focused on subfields such as 
employee recruitment, compensation, and training.74  As a result, the 
academic discipline is criticized for its “dearth of intellectually 
substantive content” in certain areas,75 as well as “an institutional, 
and somewhat chatty literature.”76  On the professional side, human 
resources employees have struggled to establish themselves as 
professionals and important firm players.  The field does not have the 
strict accreditation requirements that professions such as law, 
medicine, or engineering impose.77  Moreover, while HR professionals 
often see themselves as part of management, they must often stand 
apart from management in order to do their role properly.  This 
division—being part of the managerial class and yet also separate from 
it—has led to the somewhat schizophrenic approach that the field can 
sometimes display.78 
Given the overlap between the mandate of HR departments and 
the extensive network of legal regulations for the workplace, it remains 
puzzling that law and HR have remained, as professions, somewhat 
distant cousins.  While legal education has classes on the exact same 
laws with which HR departments must grapple, those classes are 
                                                          
73 One example has been the push for “personnel economics,” which applies 
economics principles (largely from labor economics) to human resources decision.  See 
EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS 1 (1998) (“Personnel is 
now a science that provides detailed and unambiguous answers to the issues that 
trouble managers today.”).   
74 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 108. 
75 Id.  
76 LAZEAR, supra note ED1998, at vii.  See also id. at 1 (“Until recently, there has 
been no systematic discipline on which to base human resources decisions.”). 
77 Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 147 (“[P]ersonnel managers, unlike engineers or 
accountants, have never really developed an intellectually consistent paradigm for 
asserting their professional legitimacy.”). 
78 Id. at 148 (“[P]ersonnel managers are in an ambiguous social role—between 
employees and line managers—causing them to be distrusted by both sides.”); see 
also Richard A. Beaumont, Carlton D. Becker & Sydney R. Robertson, HR Today and 
Tomorrow: Organizational Strategies in Global Companies, in Kaufman, Beaumont 
& Helfgott, supra note KBH2003, at 416 (“HR needs to work out if and when it needs 
to be an employee advocate, the conscience of the institution, provoker of modified 
managerial behaviors, a sociological soothsayer predicting the effects of external 
forces on business, or some combination of these.”).  Cf. LAZEAR, supra note EF1998, 
at 1 (“Human resources professional are often treated as if they were the lowest form 
of managerial life.”).   
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generally taught from the perspective of litigation, using the case 
method.79  HR departments are often conceived as, at best, well-
meaning but ineffectual bureaucrats or, at worst, an employer’s tool for 
evading the spirit and/or the letter of the law with the least adverse 
consequences.80  On the HR side, the field does not want to conceive of 
itself as a mere mechanism for legal compliance.  Instead, it seeks to 
generate its own methodological approach, while at the same time 
tailoring this approach to actual workplace concerns.  In fact, HR 
academics have argued that legal mandates should not be the focus of 
the field; rather, HR departments should take a more holistic approach 
that looks at potential legal ramifications as one aspect to be 
understood and managed.81 
 Both law and human resources share one important professional 
trait in common with most other professions: they have a commitment 
to professional ethics within the field.82  Although HR lacks the 
equivalent of a bar to enforce rules of professional responsibility, the 
field is seeking to develop ethical norms and practices that will guide 
its membership.  SHRM has its own code of ethics relating to 
professional responsibility, professional development, ethical 
leadership, conflicts of interest, and use of information.83  Academics 
have also written on HR ethics, focusing on the role of HR manager 
within the firm but also as a professional.84  In fact, some HR scholars 
have questioned whether the field’s focus on the management 
                                                          
79 For a discussion of the contrasting pedagogical styles between law and HR classes, 
see Schwab, supra note SJS2002, at 385-88. 
80 Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in 
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 964-65 (1999) 
(discussing how employers and defense lawyers may render an appearance of 
nondiscrimination even when discrimination is present). 
81 Mark V. Roehling & Patrick M. Wright, Organizationally Sensible versus Legally-
Centric Approaches to Employment Decisions, 45 HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 605, 
606 (2006); see id. at 608 (defining legal-centric decision making as “decision making 
that does not involve legal requirements (i.e., a specific course of action is not strictly 
mandated by law) but gives primacy to legal considerations to the extent that other 
organizationally relevant, nonlegal considerations are essentially ignored.” (emphasis 
in original)). 
82 Losey, supra note JL1999, at 100 (“Like other recognized professions, human 
resources management has its own set of ethical standards.”). 
83 Code of Ethics, SHRM, at: http://www.shrm.org/about/Pages/code-of-ethics.aspx.  
84 See, e.g., HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ETHICS (John R. Deckop ed., 2006); THE 
ETHICS OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (John W. Budd & James 
G. Scoville eds., 2005). 
 
 
ROBERTS COURT AND HUMAN RESOURCES                          16 
 
 
perspective is the proper orientation, given the many stakeholders 
within the firm.85  As a relatively young field, HR has the potential for 
a significant amount of professional growth and development. 
 
II. EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS UNDER THE ROBERTS COURT 
 
 The Roberts Court has had a brief time – roughly five years – to 
make its mark.  Its mark in employment law has already been fairly 
significant.  What follows is a brief discussion of a number of the 
Roberts Court’s employment law cases in the categories of employment 
discrimination, retaliation, privacy, and ERISA.  In these areas, the 
Court has shown a proclivity for considering the ramifications of their 
decisions on human resources employees as well as lawyers and 
litigants. 
 
A. Discrimination 
 
 Federal protections against discrimination have proved to be the 
most influential of the federal workplace statutory schemes.  The 
primary federal antidiscrimination statutes are Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which protects against discrimination based on 
race, ethnicity, national origin, religion and sex;86  the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits 
discrimination based on age;87 the Americans with Disabilities Act 
                                                          
85 See, e.g., THE HUMAN RESOURCES REVOLUTION: WHY PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST 
MATTERS (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2006); Karen Legge, The Morality 
of HRM, in Mabey, Salaman & Storey, supra note MSS1998, at 18, 18 (“When 
reading accounts of HRM practice in the UK and North America, it is noticeable the 
extent to which the data are (literally) the voice of management.”); Mary E. Graham 
& Lindsay M. Tarbell, The Importance of the Employee Perspective in the 
Competency Development of Human Resource Professionals, 45 HUMAN RESOURCES 
MGMT. 337, 338 (2006) (arguing that HR has to recognize its management-oriented 
focus and consider alternative stakeholder perspectives, particularly the employee 
perspective).  
86 42 U.S.C. §§2000e—2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).  Section 1981 provides 
protections in and out of the workplace against racial discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 
1981.  
87 29 U.S.C. §§ 621—634 (2006). 
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(ADA), which protects disabled workers;88 and the Equal Pay Act, 
which prohibits disparate compensation between employees because of 
differences in their sexes.89  In terms of enforcement, all of these 
statutes focus on private causes of action brought by the victims of 
discrimination.  Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
prototype for antidiscrimination causes of action, supplies the primary 
definition of conduct rendered unlawful by the Act: “to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”90  In order to pursue a claim based on a § 703 
violation, the claimant must file a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.91  This filing process belies the largely 
private nature of most claims, as the EEOC generally provides “right 
to sue” letters allowing the claimant to bring a private right of action.  
The EEOC still litigates a small but significant number of claims 
which it has deemed to have merit.92  But for the vast majority of 
claimants, the EEOC plays no screening function, and they must use 
their own resources to bring suit.93 
 The world of Title VII litigation was transformed by the 1991 
Civil Rights Act.94  In addition to changing the standards for mixed 
motives cases and discriminatory impact claims, the 1991 Act provided 
for juries, compensatory damages, and punitive damages in Title VII 
cases.95  These changes dramatically shifted the economics of potential 
claims. Instead of appearing before a judge to seek only back pay and 
reinstatement, Title VII plaintiffs could be heard by a jury and were 
entitled to damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and the 
                                                          
88 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101—12213 (2006). 
89 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
91 A claimant may instead file a charge with a state civil right agency which has a 
“work-sharing” agreement with with EEOC under § 706(c) of the Act.  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5 (2006); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); EEOC v. Commercial 
Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988). 
92 See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002). 
93 SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 1063 (3d ed. 2008) (“The EEOC plays no 
screening function.”). 
94 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 1977A(b) (2006) (compensatory and punitive damages), id. § 1977A(c) 
(jury trial). 
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malice of the defendant.  The increase in potential remuneration 
attracted a new set of attorneys, who could build practices on these 
more lucrative cases.96 
 Not surprisingly, Supreme Court decisions and scholarly 
commentary have focused on litigation-oriented concerns when it 
comes to the enforcement of Title VII.  Considerable time and attention 
has been paid to fleshing out the basics as to who can bring a Title VII 
claim, what they need to prove to survive motions to dismiss and 
summary judgment, and what damages they are entitled to receive.  
The Court’s decision in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green,97 which 
established the requirements for a prima facie case under Title VII, 
has been cited in over 41,000 cases.98  Despite the depth of precedent 
that the Roberts Court inherited when it comes to Title VII litigation, 
the work continues, even when it comes to basic questions such as the 
standard of proof.99 
 In the cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth100 and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,101 the Rehnquist Court created an 
affirmative defense for Title VII defendants.  That affirmative defense 
paved the way for a legally-sanctioned approach to internal human-
resources policies.  In both cases, supervisors had subjected the 
plaintiffs to hostile work environments, and the Court needed to 
determine whether the employer was vicariously liable for the actions 
of its supervisors.102  The Court found that liability did attach to the 
employer when the supervisor had immediate (or higher) authority 
over the employee.  At the same time, however, the Court allowed for 
employers to raise an affirmative defense to such liability.  In order to 
maintain the defense, employers needed to meet two elements: “(a) 
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
                                                          
96 Sturm, supra note SS 2002, at 279. 
97 411 U.S. 792 (1973).   
98 See Westlaw Keycite search for all cases citing McDonnell-Douglas v. Green on 
March 17, 2013. 
99 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (holding that a 
mixed-motives jury instruction is never proper in ADEA case). 
100 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
101 524 U.S. 775 (1998).  
102 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. 
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otherwise.”103 The Court provided further specifics as to reasonable 
behavior under these circumstances might mean: 
 
While proof that an employer had promulgated an 
antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not 
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need 
for a stated policy suitable to the employment 
circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any 
case when litigating the first element of the defense. And 
while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the 
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm 
is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use 
any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a 
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to 
satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of 
the defense. 104 
 
 Faragher and Ellerth provided the cornerstone for a new HR-
oriented approach to sexual harassment disputes.105 The Court’s 
Faragher opinion specifically justified the new defense as a way of 
addressing harassment outside of the litigation process: 
 
Although Title VII seeks to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination, its primary objective, like that of any 
statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to 
provide redress but to avoid harm. As long ago as 1980, 
the EEOC, charged with the enforcement of Title VII, 
adopted regulations advising employers to “take all steps 
necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, 
such as ... informing employees of their right to raise and 
how to raise the issue of harassment,” and in 1990 the 
EEOC issued a policy statement enjoining employers to 
                                                          
103 Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
104 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08. 
105 See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form 
over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 17 (2003) 
(noting that “[n]ews of the Faragher and Ellerth decisions spread quickly through the 
world of human resources” and “human resources consultants found themselves in 
high demand”). 
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establish a complaint procedure “designed to encourage 
victims of harassment to come forward [without 
requiring] a victim to complain first to the offending 
supervisor.” It would therefore implement clear statutory 
policy and complement the Government's Title VII 
enforcement efforts to recognize the employer's 
affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give credit 
here to employers who make reasonable efforts to 
discharge their duty. Indeed, a theory of vicarious liability 
for misuse of supervisory power would be at odds with the 
statutory policy if it failed to provide employers with some 
such incentive.106 
 
Faragher and Ellerth thus marked an explicit doctrinal structure 
tailored toward the human resources machinery existing within many 
workplaces.  By providing guidance on how to manage hostile 
workplace and harassment complaints internally, the Court set up a 
system of private enforcement that would precede and shape the 
litigation process.  Employers would have an incentive to create such 
processes, and employees would benefit from having their claims 
resolved earlier and with less time and expense. 
 The Roberts Court has followed the lead of Faragher and Ellerth 
in tailoring an approach to discrimination that caters to the HR 
approach.  In Ricci v. DeStefano,107 the Court dealt with an intriguing 
set of facts, in which one side’s faith in fair process is set against the 
other side’s concern with unjust results.  It involves firefighters – a 
profession with a sterling reputation for acting in the public good, but 
at the same time an ugly history of racial exclusion.108  Justice 
Sotomayor – who came up for confirmation right after the decision was 
handed down – had authored the opinion that the Court overturned.109  
Despite its notoriety, however, the Court’s opinion in Ricci rests on 
more moderate premises: namely, the proper process for using race in 
judging the results of promotional examinations.  In its exegesis of the 
proper process, the Court is careful to respect the process that went 
                                                          
106 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06 (quotations and citations omitted). 
107 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
108 Id. at 610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Firefighting is a profession in which the 
legacy of racial discrimination casts an especially long shadow.”). 
109 Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
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into the test: namely, the creation and administration of the test by 
human resources professionals. 
In Ricci, white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter sued 
New Haven and its officials, alleging that the city violated Title VII by 
refusing to certify results of promotional examination.  New Haven had 
commissioned the examination in order to create a pool of potential 
candidates for the rank of lieutenant and captain.110  The city paid 
Industrial/Organizational Solutions, Inc. (IOS), an HR consulting 
company, $100,000 to create the test.111  The Court described the 
process in some detail.  It discussed how IOS had studied the 
firefighters’ jobs by interviewing current lieutenants and captains and 
by riding along with on-duty officers.112  It described how IOS 
developed multiple choice and oral examinations based on an extensive 
set of training materials as well as job-analysis information.113  The 
Court also explained how the tests were evaluated.114  In its 
explication of the process, the Court emphasized how the materials 
were designed to be free from racially discriminatory impact.115 
 The tests were challenged after white and Hispanic candidates, 
but no African-American candidates, qualified for the next set of 
available positions.116  After a series of meetings and testimony from a 
variety of perspectives, the city’s civil service review board voted not to 
certify the results of the test.  The city defended its decision based on 
its concern about the discriminatory impact of the test results.  It 
                                                          
110 Ricci, 557 U.S  at 564-65. 
111 Id. at 564. 
112 Id. at 564-65 (“IOS representatives interviewed incumbent captains and 
lieutenants and their supervisors. They rode with and observed other on-duty 
officers. Using information from those interviews and ride-alongs, IOS wrote job-
analysis questionnaires and administered them to most of the incumbent battalion 
chiefs, captains, and lieutenants in the Department.”). 
113 Id. at 565 (“For each test, IOS compiled a list of training manuals, Department 
procedures, and other materials to use as sources for the test questions.”). 
114 Id. (“IOS assembled a pool of 30 assessors who were superior in rank to the 
positions being tested. . . .  IOS trained the panelists for several hours on the day 
before it administered the examinations, teaching them how to score the candidates' 
responses consistently using checklists of desired criteria.”). 
115 Id.  (noting that IOS “oversampled minority firefighters to ensure that the results 
. . . would not unintentionally favor white candidates” and “sixty-six percent of the 
[evaluation] panelists were minorities, and each of the nine three-member 
assessment panels contained two minority members”). 
116 Id. at 566-67. 
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argued that had the results been certified, African-American 
firefighters could have sued the city for violating Title VII’s prohibition 
on hiring decision with a discriminatory impact.117  However, the white 
and Hispanic firefighters who had been in line for the promotion based 
on the test results sued.118  They argued that the city’s refusal to 
certify the test was discriminatory treatment under Title VII.  The 
Court agreed.  It held that “race-based action like the City’s in this 
case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can 
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the 
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact 
statute.”119  Finding that New Haven did not have a strong basis, the 
Court held the city had violated Title VII. 
 No matter where you come down on the case, New Haven’s 
predicament draws forth some sympathy.120  Neither option – keeping 
the test or rejecting it – seems ideal from a moral perspective, and in 
fact the city seems to have spent gone to significant time and expense 
to avoid a result like the one the test produced.  And facially, at least, 
the city had a statistical basis for concern that the test had had a 
discriminatory impact.  Arguably, a Court predisposed to human 
resources discretion would have given the city room to maneuver here.  
In fact, that is what the Society for Human Resources Management 
(SHRM) argued in its amicus brief: 
 
SHRM and its members wish to maintain the flexibility in 
existing law that allows employers and other test users 
significant discretion in deciding how best to address 
disparate-impact issues: whether to proceed with a given 
selection procedure subject to completion of the validation 
process; whether to modify expected uses so as to ensure 
that scoring and ranking of scores are valid and fair; or 
                                                          
117 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). 
118 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562-63. 
119 Id. at 563. 
120 Id. at 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This case presents an unfortunate situation . 
. . .”); Luke Appling, Recent Development, Ricci v. DeStefano, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 147, 147 (2010) (“In March 2004, the City of New Haven, Connecticut faced a 
difficult choice.”). 
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whether to substitute a different selection process with a 
lesser disparate impact on particular groups.121 
 
In order to preserve this flexibility, argued SHRM’s brief, the Court 
needed to find the City’s decision to be constitutional.  
Instead, the Court held that the City acted unconstitutionally 
because it lacked a strong basis in evidence to believe that going 
forward with the test results would violate Title VII’s disparate impact 
provision.  In so doing, the Court seems to set up a Scylla-and-
Charibdis scenario for future employers.  As Justice Ginsburg argued, 
“The strong-basis-in-evidence standard, however, as barely described 
in general, and cavalierly applied in this case, makes voluntary 
compliance a hazardous venture.”122  A court that was simply pro-
business or intent on voluntary compliance would not have ruled the 
way it did in Ricci.  It would instead have given employers wide berth 
to conduct their own analyses and make decisions based on those 
analyses.  But, despite the SHRM’s argument to the contrary, that 
does not mean that Ricci is an anti-HR opinion.  In fact, the Ricci 
decision is most legitimately justified as an effort to protect HR efforts 
in the areas of promotion and testing. 
 The Court set up two alternative paths for finding a strong basis 
in evidence for discriminatory impact liability.  First, the employer 
may have a strong basis in evidence to believe that examinations were 
not job-related and consistent with business necessity.  Or second, the 
employer may have a strong basis in evidence to believe there existed 
equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative to the examinations.  In a 
somewhat surprising move, the Court did not remand to the lower 
courts to determine whether New Haven met this standard; instead, it 
ruled that the city had failed to do so and thus was in violation.123  The 
Court based its determination on its support for the time, resources, 
and care that had been spent in crafting the examinations in the first 
place. 
                                                          
121 Brief for Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management in Support of 
Petitioner at 1, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07–1428, 08–328) 
[hereinafter SHRM Ricci Amicus Brief].   
122 Id. at 629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. (noting “the discordance of the 
Court's opinion with the voluntary compliance ideal”). 
123 Id. at 631 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When this Court formulates a new legal 
rule, the ordinary course is to remand and allow the lower courts to apply the rule in 
the first instance.”). 
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 The Court first found that there was “no genuine dispute” that 
the examinations were job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.  The Court noted that the examinations were based on IOS’s 
“painstaking analyses” of the officer positions as gleaned through 
source material and direct observation.124  Although some candidates 
complained about certain questions, these complaints were reviewed 
and, in one case, acted upon.125  The City never requested from IOS the 
follow-up report analyzing the validity of the results, despite the fact 
that the report was part of the contract.126  All of these factors point to 
the reasonable and good-faith efforts of IOS, the human resources 
consultants who managed the testing process.  To the extent that 
throwing the test out was an indictment of IOS’s work, the Court found 
that such an indictment was completely unjustified. 
 The Court then fended off arguments that a better alternative 
set of testing instruments were available.  Critics of the test argued 
that the oral portion should have been more heavily weighted; that the 
city could have interpreted its internal procedures differently; and that 
an alternative testing method such as an “assessment center process” 
would have been superior.127  Essentially, the Court rejects these 
alternatives as ex post efforts to rejigger the results, without proof that 
they are in fact better testing instruments.128  The Court is 
particularly dismissive of the alternative testing method evidence, as it 
was provided by a direct competitor of IOS.129  The competitor’s 
witness admitted that he had not studied the test in detail, and offered 
praise for the test at points.130  He also made it clear he was angling 
for future work; in fact, the competitor ended up getting significant 
business from the city after it had rejected IOS’s efforts.131  Such mixed 
testimony was insufficient, in the Court’s eyes, to create an issue of 
material fact. 
 The Court did not say that race could not play a role in the 
creation of a testing instrument.  In fact, it is clear that New Haven 
                                                          
124 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 588. 
125 Id.  The Court also noted that an outside advisor “suspect[ed] that some of the 
criticisms ... [leveled] by candidates were not valid.” Id.  
126 Id. at 589. 
127 Id. at 589-92. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 591-92. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
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and IOS were concerned about racial disparity on the test, and that 
they undertook efforts to redress any racial imbalance at the outset.  
As the Court states, “Title VII does not prohibit an employer from 
considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that 
test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, 
regardless of their race. And when, during the test-design stage, an 
employer invites comments to ensure the test is fair, that process can 
provide a common ground for open discussions toward that end.”132  
However, the Court also makes clear that once the test has been taken, 
the time for second-guessing is over.  Only a strong basis to believe 
that the tests were ill-designed, or that there were better alternatives 
available, will allow for the test results to be ignored. 
Thus, a decision that initially seems to constrict employer 
flexibility instead is designed to provide for HR certainty.  The Court’s 
opinion front-loads the review process for the examination and thereby 
creates more certainty in the final results.  It protects the reasonable 
and good-faith efforts of HR professionals from ongoing, after-the-fact 
debates about the validity of the mechanism.  It is a pro-HR decision in 
that it seeks to insulate HR business judgment from ex post scrutiny.  
Although the Court held New Haven liable in this instance, it perhaps 
intended Ricci to embolden future employers to stick with their tests 
and thereby give such tests more credibility going forward. 
 The Ricci test does have some flexibility and ambiguity, in that a 
“strong basis” does not mean certain liability.133  But in the narrative 
of the Court’s opinion, the most trustworthy player would seem to be 
IOS.  Ricci reasserts the role of HR professionals in managing the 
hiring and promotion process.134  And it gives such professionals 
deference in doing their jobs.  By holding New Haven liable for 
rejecting its test after the fact, the Court sends a signal: in HR we 
trust, and so should you. 
                                                          
132 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585. 
133 Id. at 581 (rejecting the rule that “an employer in fact must be in violation of the 
disparate-impact provision” because such a rule would “bring compliance efforts to a 
near standstill”). 
134 Interestingly, the SHRM amicus brief does not discuss the development of the test 
in its Statement of the Case, nor does it ever mention IOS by name.  See SHRM Ricci 
Amicus Brief, supra note SHRM2009.  Instead, it argues that the City should have 
the right to question the test after the fact, particularly if the City follows the 
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures promulgated by the EEOC. 
Id. at 13-18. 
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The majority’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes135 is 
the flip side of that trust: namely, distrust in the courts.  The Dukes 
case involved a Title VII class action brought by three named plaintiffs 
on behalf of 1.5 million employees and former employees of Wal-Mart 
stores across the country.136  At issue was Wal-Mart’s system of 
supervision, including pay and promotion decisions, which the Court’s 
opinion (and Wal-Mart) describe as highly discretionary at the grass 
roots level.  For pay, lower-level managers have discretion to set pay 
within certain ranges, while higher-level executives set the ranges for 
managers and other salaried employees.137 Promotions are also made 
at lower levels.  Although admission to Wal-Mart’s management 
training system does require that certain objective factors be met, such 
as above-average performance ratings and a willingness to relocate, 
managers have significant discretion in selecting candidates for 
training and for promotions beyond the program.138  It is this common 
personnel practice—namely, discretion over pay and promotion at 
lower levels—that plaintiffs allege as the common factor that created 
the discrimination against the class. 
The Dukes Court was unanimous in rejecting the lower court’s 
class action certification as a Rule 23(b)(2) class.139  However, the four 
dissenters would have given the plaintiffs leave to replead their action 
as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action,140 while the majority also rejected the 
certification for failing to meet the commonality requirement in Rule 
23(a)(2).141  According to the majority, it was possible that some 
number—possibly even a large number—of female Wal-Mart 
employees had individual Title VII claims based on their mistreatment 
at the hands of a particular supervisor.  However, for the claims to be 
triable as a class action, the plaintiffs had to share a “common 
contention” that was “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide 
resolution.”142  As the majority pointed out, “Here respondents wish to 
sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without 
                                                          
135 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). 
136 Id. at 2547. 
137 Id.  
138 Id.  
139 See id. at 2557; id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
140 Id. 
141 Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2550-57. 
142 Id. at 2551. 
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some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, 
it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' 
claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question 
why was I disfavored.”143  Thus, in order for the class action to proceed, 
the discretionary system in and of itself had to be the common answer 
to this question. 
 The dissent seemed comfortable with the notion that a policy of 
great discretion on the part of lower-level supervisors could itself be 
the root cause of discrimination.  That discretion was allegedly warped 
in part by the fact that most managers were men, and thus would be 
more likely to choose men for promotion and higher pay, as well as in 
part by a corporate culture that was suffused with sexism.144  The 
dissent summarized its position in this way: “Wal–Mart's delegation of 
discretion over pay and promotions is a policy uniform throughout all 
stores. The very nature of discretion is that people will exercise it in 
various ways. A system of delegated discretion . . . is a practice 
actionable under Title VII when it produces discriminatory 
outcomes.”145  However, the majority rejected the dissent’s approach as 
giving the plaintiff’s case too much credence.  The majority opinion 
found the plaintiff’s anecdotal evidence to be far too thin to support a 
class-based inference of discrimination.146  It rejected the statistical 
evidence as insufficient to prove discrimination against the members of 
the class.147  And it rejected plaintiffs’ sociological evidence that Wal-
Mart had a “strong corporate culture” that rendered it “vulnerable” to 
gender bias.148  According to the majority, it could “safely disregard” 
this testimony once the sociologist conceded that he did not have any 
way to quantify the impact of this culture on actual employment 
decisions.149 
 If it seems like this is getting into the merits of plaintiffs’ case, 
then perhaps it is.  The dissenters argued that the majority was in fact 
labeling its concerns as “commonality” issues when they were actually 
issues for consideration under Rule 23(b)(3).150  In either case, the 
                                                          
143 Id. at 2552 (emphasis in original). 
144 Id. at 2562-63 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
145 Id. at 2567. 
146 Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556. 
147 Id. at 2555-56. 
148 Id. at 2553-54. 
149 Id. at 2554. 
150 Id. at 2565-66 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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plaintiffs seem to facially have the makings of a certifiable class action: 
common employee management system plus significantly lopsided 
statistics equal Title VII class action.  The majority could not gainsay 
the fact that a purely discretionary system may in fact be a vehicle for 
discrimination.  But it can, however, require the plaintiffs to show just 
exactly how that discretion was warped in a particular case.  The 
Court stated: 
 
To be sure, we have recognized that, “in appropriate 
cases,” giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be 
the basis of Title VII liability under a disparate-impact 
theory—since an employer's undisciplined system of 
subjective decisionmaking can have precisely the same 
effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional 
discrimination. . . . But the recognition that this type of 
Title VII claim “can” exist does not lead to the conclusion 
that every employee in a company using a system of 
discretion has such a claim in common. To the contrary, 
left to their own devices most managers in any 
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation 
that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, 
performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that 
produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may choose 
to reward various attributes that produce disparate 
impact—such as scores on general aptitude tests or 
educational achievements. . . . And still other managers 
may be guilty of intentional discrimination that produces 
a sex-based disparity. In such a company, demonstrating 
the invalidity of one manager's use of discretion will do 
nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another's. A 
party seeking to certify a nationwide class will be unable 
to show that all the employees' Title VII claims will in fact 
depend on the answers to common questions.151 
 
 This passage hits at the crux of the Court’s theory of the case.  
Discretion itself cannot be enough; there must be some discriminatory 
inference strong enough to extend across the individual actions at 
issue or (as in this case) a class of plaintiffs.  And that’s because, 
                                                          
151 Id. at 2554. 
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according to the majority, “left to their own devices most managers in 
any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that 
forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-
based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable 
disparity at all.”152  And yet in Dukes, there was a disparity: although 
women filled 70 percent of the hourly jobs in Wal-Mart stores, they 
made up only 33 percent of management employees.153  The Court 
consigns this disparity to the realm of individual actions. 
 The Court’s defense of discretion, even in the face of disparity 
and some limited but noxious anecdotal evidence, has larger 
ramifications.  By protecting the role of discretion in personnel 
decisionmaking, the Court preserved a certain approach to HR 
management against class-action attack.  This position echoes the 
SHRM amicus brief, which argued that individualized decisionmaking 
programs reflected sound HR practices.154  More importantly, the 
Court affirmed the notion that, even in the face of anecdotal and 
statistical evidence to the contrary, the bad faith of individual 
managers cannot be presumed.  Instead, the opinion assumes that 
discretion will be used appropriately until proven otherwise.  It keeps 
courts out of the business of mandating changes to discretionary 
personnel practices, and instead keeps them focused on the rotten 
actors who use discretion improperly.155  As such, they work with HR 
professionals to police a personnel system, rather than mandating that 
such professionals use a system that creates a nondiscriminatory 
result.  In the short term, this may result in more complete justice for 
                                                          
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
154 Brief for Amici Curiae Society for Human Resource Management and HR Policy 
Association in Support of Petitioner at 8, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 
2541 (2011) (No. 10-277) [hereinafter SHRM Dukes Amicus Brief].  SHRM also noted 
that “certifying a massive class without even considering the impact of Wal-Mart’s 
diversity policies on its culture and decision-making” would “underestimate[] the 
value of such programs and weaken[] the incentives to create or maintain voluntary 
diversity programs.”  Id.  
155 See also Matt Bodie, Workplace Rules, Room for Debate, NYTIMES.COM, at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-
action/leaving-it-to-the-workplace (“Allowing these claims to go forward as a class 
would transfer a huge chunk of employee management from private human resources 
professionals to the courts. And that does not interest the Roberts Court in the 
least.”). 
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those plaintiffs who were severely harmed.  But it does reflect the 
Court’s faith in the good faith of Wal-Mart managers. 
If Dukes is the Roberts Court’s most famous employment law 
case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.156 is its most 
notorious.  Its crabbed and parsimonious reading of Title VII’s statute 
of limitations was roundly rejected by Congress,157 and the plaintiff 
has become something of a celebrity in the aftermath.158  The Court’s 
holding – that plaintiffs are responsible for determining if their pay is 
discriminatory, even if they have no idea about the discrimination – 
seems to reflect a tin-eared approach to the underlying problem.  There 
is such an obvious objection to the impracticality of the Court’s holding 
that even legal laity had grounds to object.  Why would the Court put 
itself in such a controversial position?  The decision was decidedly pro-
employer, conservative, and anti-litigation.  And perhaps these labels 
tell the entire story.  But once again, I would argue that the Court is 
looking at the case not through the eyes of Lilly Ledbetter, but through 
the eyes of HR departments.  And the case looks less objectionable 
through those lenses. 
Ledbetter worked at Goodyear for almost twenty years.  Over 
time, her pay fell off in comparison with her cohort of managers, who 
were all men.  At the end of her employ, Ledbetter was making roughly 
$3700 a month, compared with a range of $4200 to $5200 for her 
colleagues.159  Ledbetter had no sense of this disparity, however, until 
she took early retirement.  The average person can sympathize (or 
perhaps empathize) with Ledbetter’s anger and sense of betrayal at 
finding out about the large difference in pay.  Moreover, it is easy to 
understand why she didn’t know about it.  As Justic Ginsburg related, 
in dissent: 
 
Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden 
from the employee's view. Employers may keep under 
wraps the pay differentials maintained among 
supervisors, no less the reasons for those differentials. 
Small initial discrepancies may not be seen as meet for a 
                                                          
156 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
157 Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (2009). 
158 Gail Collins, Lily’s Big Day, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A27. 
159 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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federal case, particularly when the employee, trying to 
succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to 
making waves.160 
 
 The Court decision, written by Justice Alito, spends very little 
time on the facts.161  The Court is fairly narrow and doctrinal in its 
holding, pointing to the concept of “discrete discriminatory acts” as 
triggering time limit for filing an EEOC charge.162  In justifying the 
decision on policy grounds, the Court points to the usual justifications 
for statutes of limitations: the need for prompt resolution of disputes, 
the staleness of evidence over time, and the desire for finality.163  As 
the Court notes, the 180-day EEOC charging deadline is “short by any 
measure,” and it reflects an intention to “encourage the prompt 
processing of all charges of employment discrimination.”164   The Court 
also notes that the deadline “reflects Congress’ strong preference for 
the prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations 
through voluntary conciliation and cooperation.”165  The Court spends 
a more significant amount of time, however, analyzing the problem of 
reconstructing intent many years after the fact.  As the Court states: 
 
For example, in a case such as this in which the plaintiff's 
claim concerns the denial of raises, the employer's 
challenged acts (the decisions not to increase the 
employee's pay at the times in question) will almost 
always be documented and will typically not even be in 
                                                          
160 Id. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
161 This is the Court’s only description:  
Petitioner Lilly Ledbetter (Ledbetter) worked for respondent 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear) at its Gadsden, 
Alabama, plant from 1979 until 1998. During much of this time, 
salaried employees at the plant were given or denied raises based on 
their supervisors' evaluation of their performance. In March 1998, 
Ledbetter submitted a questionnaire to the EEOC alleging certain 
acts of sex discrimination, and in July of that year she filed a formal 
EEOC charge.  
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007). 
162 Id. at 628 (“The EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful 
practice takes place.”). 
163 Id. at 629-32. 
164 Id. at 630. 
165 Id. at 630-31. 
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dispute. By contrast, the employer's intent is almost 
always disputed, and evidence relating to intent may fade 
quickly with time. In most disparate-treatment cases, 
much if not all of the evidence of intent is circumstantial. 
Thus, the critical issue in a case involving a long-past 
performance evaluation will often be whether the 
evaluation was so far off the mark that a sufficient 
inference of discriminatory intent can be drawn.  This can 
be a subtle determination, and the passage of time may 
seriously diminish the ability of the parties and the 
factfinder to reconstruct what actually happened.166 
 
This is a concern that would resonate with human resources.  
Following the Faragher and Ellerth roadmap, HR departments look to 
take the lead on internal investigations.  If the department doesn’t 
know about the problem, they cannot investigate it.  Instead, they are 
left to deal with the problem well after the fact.  It is much harder to 
demonstrate the good faith of an employment decision years later, 
when evidence that would have been available contemporaneously 
with the decision no longer exists.167 
 Moreover, compensation procedures are particularly thorny.  
Because of the range of possibilities when it comes to compensation, 
both in amount and type, the human resources literature has spent 
extensive amounts of time on establishing best practices in the area.168  
Of course, the problem of pay disparity is a continuing and insidious 
problem.  In my view, the Court’s decision reflected an overly legalistic 
                                                          
166 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 631-32 (citations omitted). 
 
167 SHRM and the Equal Employment Advisory Council make this point in their 
brief, arguing that finding for Ledbetter would essentially eliminate the statute of 
limitation and would impose an “undue burden” on the employer to defend against 
stale claims.  Brief for Amici Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council and Society 
for Human Resource Management in Support of Petitioner at 5-6, Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 5-1074) [hereinafter 
SHRM Ledbetter Amicus Brief].  
168 See, e.g., Barry Gerhart et al., Employee Compensation: Theory, Practice, and 
Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 528 (Gerald R. Ferris et 
al. eds. 1995); Stephen E. Condrey et al., Compensation: Choosing and Using the 
Best System for Your Organization, in HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 421 (Ronald R. Sims ed. 
2007) 
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and HR-oriented response to a difficult problem.  But it becomes more 
understandable when viewed through the eyes of those whose job it is 
to manage compensation policies—especially when we do not assume 
bad faith. 
 
B. Retaliation 
 
Those looking to apply a purely “conservative” or “pro-business” 
meme to the Roberts Court’s labor and employment law cases must 
contend with the Court’s work in the area of retaliation.  The Court’s 
decision in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,169 one 
of its first decisions as a court, considered the scope of Title VII 
protections afforded against retaliation.  The Court rejected lower 
courts’ narrower interpretations and instead concluded that the 
antiretaliation provisions were not confined to those that are related to 
employment or that occur at the workplace.170 The Court also held that 
an employer’s actions could be considered retaliation if “they could well 
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”171  Although Justice Alito concurred in judgment, 
proposing a narrower standard,172 the other eight Justices all agreed to 
the expansive interpretation.  The retaliation at issue in the case could 
have been viewed as de minimis, as the plaintiff had been reassigned 
with loss in pay or benefits, and the employer retracted her 37-day 
suspension after the fact, giving her backpay.173  Nevertheless, the 
Court unanimously affirmed the jury’s award of $43,500.174   
The Court arguably expanded its definition of retaliation in 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.175  Thompson concerned 
an employer’s alleged decision to fire the fiancé of an employee in 
retaliation for the employee’s decision to file a sex discrimination claim 
with the EEOC.176  The Court had “little trouble” concluding that the 
alleged facts constituted a violation of Title VII’s antiretaliation 
                                                          
169 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
170 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 75 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
173 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 58. 
174 Id. at 58, 70-73. 
175 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
176 Id. at 867. 
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provisions.177  Relying on the Burlington standard, the Court said: “We 
think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from 
engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiance would be 
fired.”178   The Court was not troubled by the lack of bright-line rule as 
to the type of relationships covered.179  Flexibility was necessary to 
accommodate “the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace 
contexts in which retaliation may occur.”180  Even though the fired 
employee was not the target of the retaliatory motive, the Court found 
he still had standing to sue because he fell within the “zone of 
interests” protected by the statute.181  Because hurting the plaintiff 
was the employer’s chosen and unlawful means for retaliating against 
his fiancée, he was “well within the zone of interests sought to be 
protected by Title VII.”182 
The results of these cases may not seem particularly friendly to 
human resources departments.  In fact, SHRM (in conjunction with the 
National Federation of Independent Businesses) filed an amicus brief 
in support of the employer in Burlington.183  The brief argued that 
retaliation should be limited to ultimate tangible employment actions, 
such as firing or failure to promote, because otherwise the employer’s 
hands would be tied in its day-to-day employee management.184  
According to the amici, allowing retaliation claims on these lower-order 
offenses would provide a “temptation” for employees and their 
attorneys to opt out of the internal grievance system and file suit.185  
However, two points should be noted.  First, in both cases, an employee 
had already stepped outside of the employer’s internal HR process and 
filed an antidiscrimination claim.  Thus, the claim that employers 
needed to be free of government interference is belied to an extent by 
                                                          
177 Id.   
178 Id. at 868. 
179 Id. (“We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the 
Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will 
almost never do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize.”). 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 870. 
182 Id.  
183 Brief for Amici Curiae Society for Human Resource Management  and National 
Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner , 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (No. 05-259) 
[hereinafter SHRM Burlington Amicus Brief].   
184 Id. at 4, 16-21. 
185 Id. at 14. 
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the preexisting claim, which had already brought the government into 
the picture.  Second, the recognition of claims based on smaller-bore 
offenses actually helps well-intentioned HR departments do their jobs 
in correcting improper conduct.  HR must stand as a bulwark against 
the decisions by other firm participants that violate the law or public 
policy.  The amici recognized this in their brief: 
 
[R]etaliation claims often concern conduct arising from an 
emotional response that simply reflects human nature: a 
supervisor wrongfully accused of discrimination may, 
without intending impermissible retaliation, get caught 
up in the heat of the moment. The employer's internal 
mechanisms, implemented through a human resource 
professional or upper level management, who act as 
goalkeepers, fulfill the employer's responsibility to ensure 
that human nature is not permitted to eviscerate 
statutory rights. Missteps of human nature should be 
permitted to be investigated and potentially cured by 
internal review.186 
 
What the brief misses, however, is that the incentive for other 
members of the firm to go along with HR’s internal review is (at least 
in part) the fear that the firm will suffer government sanctions if it 
fails to obey HR. Thus, the HR department would be rendered 
relatively toothless in fighting against retaliation if employers could 
carry out their attacks below the radar without fear of being called to 
account.  And if lower-level retaliation goes unchecked, then future 
potential claimants will be chilled in their decisions about filing a 
claim—at least, if they still hope to stay with the company.  Thus, poor 
antiretaliation enforcement could cause the entire edifice of internal 
dispute resolution to come crumbling down.  As the Court recognized in 
Burlington, “An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee 
by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by causing 
him harm outside the workplace.  A provision limited to employment-
related actions would not deter the many forms that effective 
retaliation can take.”187 
                                                          
186 Id. at 17. 
187 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63-64 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
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The ramifications of strong antiretaliation protection within a 
HR-oriented framework became clear in Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee.188  In 
Crawford, the employer had received complaints about inappropriate 
sexual behavior by the newly-hired employee relations director for the 
school district.189  The matter was routed through the human resources 
department,190 and the assistant HR director contacted employees in 
the director’s department pursuant to her investigation.  One of those 
employees, Vicky Crawford, reported to the assistant HR director that 
the employee relations director had sexually harassed her and her 
fellow employees.191  To this point, however, Crawford has brought no 
formal complaint either internally, with the EEOC, or with a state civil 
rights agency.  After the investigation, the employer concluded that 
Hughes had engaged in inappropriate behavior but did not take any 
disciplinary investigation against him.  All three employees who had 
testified in the HR investigation, however, were terminated.192  
Crawford was fired for alleged embezzlement and drug use – charges 
she claimed were later proven to be untrue.193  She brought suit 
claiming that she was protected by Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provisions. 
The lower courts had dismissed Crawford’s claim, finding that 
her claim did not meet the requirements for Title VII’s protection 
under either the “participation” clause or the “opposition” clause.  
                                                          
188 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
189 The discussion of facts was taken from Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee, 211 F. App'x. 373, 374-375 (6th Cir. 
2006), which has a more extensive narrative of the events in question. 
190 The employee relations director would normally have been responsible for 
investigating such complaints.  Id. at 374. 
191 Id. at 375. 
192 Id. 
193 Id.  On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision, the district court denied the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee, 2009 WL 3348233 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 15, 
2009).  The case went to trial, and Crawford was awarded $1.56 million in damages.  
E. Thomas Wood, Crawford Lawsuit Costs Metro Another $333,000, NASHVILLE 
POST, April 13, 2010, at: 
http://www.nashvillepost.com/news/2010/4/13/crawford_lawsuit_costs_metro_another
_333000.  The employee relations director resigned in 2003 after acknowledging that 
he had falsely claimed to be a lawyer, as Navy SEAL, and a professional football 
player.  Id.  
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Section 704 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from 
discriminating against an individual “because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,” 
known as the opposition clause, or “because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter,” known as the 
participation clause.194  The Court did not reach the participation-
clause issue, but it held in favor of Crawford under the opposition 
clause.195  Finding that “Crawford's description of the louche goings-on 
would certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as resistant 
or antagonistic to Hughes's treatment,”196 the Court held that 
opposition clause protection “extends to an employee who speaks out 
about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering 
questions during an employer's internal investigation.”197 
The employer in Crawford argued that lowering the bar for 
retaliation claims would discourage employers from investigating 
claims in the first place.  The Court expressed skepticism on this point, 
as it noted “the incentive to enquire that follows from our decisions in 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. Boca Raton.”198  
Discussing the requirements of the affirmative defense, the Court 
stated that “[e]mployers are thus subject to a strong inducement to 
ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their 
operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability.”199  
Indeed, the Court pooh-poohed the employer’s fears, stating: “The 
possibility that an employer might someday want to fire someone who 
might charge discrimination traceable to an internal investigation does 
                                                          
194 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
195 The participation clause might seem to be a natural fit, since Crawford was 
participating in an investigation of sexual harassment.  But the statutory text poses 
problems, as it limits coverage to filing a charge or to “participat[ing] . . . in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” Id. (emphasis added).  
The employer’s investigation in Crawford may not be considered an investigation 
under Title VII, as it is not a governmental investigation conducted pursuant to Title 
VII authority and guidelines.   
196 Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 
276 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted). 
197 Id. at 273. 
198 Id. at 278. 
199 Id. 
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not strike us as likely to diminish the attraction of an Ellerth-Faragher 
affirmative defense.”200 
More importantly, however, the Court did find it likely that a 
contrary holding would considerably weaken the affirmative defense, 
as it would undercut the mutual incentives that provide for its 
operation.  As the Court described: 
 
If it were clear law that an employee who reported 
discrimination in answering an employer's questions 
could be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees 
would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII 
offenses against themselves or against others. This is no 
imaginary horrible given the documented indications that 
“[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay 
silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and 
discrimination.” Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L.Rev. 18, 
20 (2005); see also id., at 37, and n. 58 (compiling studies). 
The appeals court's rule would thus create a real dilemma 
for any knowledgeable employee in a hostile work 
environment if the boss took steps to assure a defense 
under our cases. If the employee reported discrimination 
in response to the enquiries, the employer might well be 
free to penalize her for speaking up. But if she kept quiet 
about the discrimination and later filed a Title VII claim, 
the employer might well escape liability, arguing that it 
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct [any 
discrimination] promptly” but “the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of ... preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.” 
Ellerth, supra, at765, 118 S.Ct. 2257.  Nothing in the 
statute's text or our precedent supports this catch-22.201 
 
 Ultimately, the Crawford Court – unanimous in result, with 
only Justices Alito and Scalia concurring in judgment – was moved by 
concerns about its Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense.  A strict 
textual reading of the statute is more equivocal that the Court allows, 
as an employee testifying about her boss’s behavior is not necessarily 
                                                          
200 Id.  at 279. 
201 Id. 
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“opposing” it.  In Crawford, the plaintiff had told her story at the 
request of a human resources official as part of an official 
investigation.  Her report about the director’s behavior was arguably 
part of her work duties; it was not an individual effort on her part to 
vindicate the wrongs that she and others had suffered.   The Court 
dismisses the possibility that testimony about discrimination or 
harassment could be supportive of such behavior as “eccentric 
cases.”202  But it does not consider the possibility that such testimony 
could be neither supportive nor opposed, but neutral.  The fact that the 
employee has not complained about such behavior, either to the 
employer or the government, is further evidence of neutrality.  It is 
something of stretch to say that invited testimony about a coworker’s 
behavior in the context of an employer’s investigation means that the 
employee “has opposed [a] practice made an unlawful employment 
practice” under Title VII.203 
 The weakness of the textual argument, in my view, heightens 
the importance of the Court’s policy arguments.  And those policy 
arguments rest on the protection of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.  As 
the Court notes in its opinion, “Ellerth and Faragher have prompted 
many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating, 
preventing, and correcting discriminatory conduct.”204  If internal 
investigations were not protected, then “knowledgeable” employees—
including those already represented by counsel—would logically (and 
reasonably) refuse to participate in such investigations.  In order to 
protect human resources departments in conducting their jobs with 
propriety and dispatch, the Court protected individuals who work with 
HR departments.  Crawford—who had not complained nor filed a 
charge, yet provided unblinking testimony to HR personnel when 
called upon to do so—was in this respect an ideal employee.  It should 
not be surprising that the Court insured that she and those like her 
would not be left out of the new antidiscrimination regulatory 
structure. 
   
C. Privacy 
 
                                                          
202 Id. at 276-77. 
203 Moreover, the Court does not determine whether the director’s conduct was 
actually a violation of Title VII. 
204 Id. at 278-79. 
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The Supreme Court has only limited jurisdiction over workplace 
privacy concerns. The primary employee privacy protections are found 
within state law.205  However, public sector employees have federal 
constitutional privacy protections.  The Rehnquist Court attempted to 
establish the standard for these protections in O’Connor v. Ortega.206 
In that case, a state hospital conducted a search of the office and files 
of an employee who had been accused of workplace wrongdoing.207  The 
employee sued the state, claiming a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches.208  In a vote split 
between a four-member plurality and one-member concurrence in the 
judgment, the Court rejected the government’s claim that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply, but it also held that neither a warrant nor 
probable cause were necessary to protect employees’ privacy interests 
against routine, work-related searches.209  Instead, the Court found 
that employees were entitled to privacy protections, but the protections 
were limited in scope.  In order to make a claim, the plurality required 
that the employee first have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to 
the location,210 and then that the employee’s expectations were violated 
by a search that failed the standard of reasonableness as to its 
inception or its scope.211  Implying a fairly nonrestrictive standard, the 
plurality noted: “Ordinarily, a search of an employee's office by a 
supervisor will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the 
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is 
necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to 
retrieve a needed file.”212  In his concurrence, Justice Scalia argued 
                                                          
205 Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 279 
(2012) (“Without federal constitutional protections, private sector employees must 
instead rely on either the common law of torts . . . or on various other federal and 
state legislative enactments, for their workplace privacy rights.”). 
206 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
207 Id. at 712-14 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion).  The employee was the chief of 
professional education for psychiatry residents at the hospital.  Id. at 712. 
208 Id. at 714. 
209 Id. at 717, 722; id. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Specifically, 
the four-member plurality limited itself to the Fourth Amendment standard for “a 
noninvestigatory work-related intrusion or an investigatory search for evidence of 
suspected work-related employee misfeasance.”  Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).  
210 Id. at 717-18.   
211 Id. at 725-26. 
212 Id. at 726.   
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that employees always had an expectation of privacy in their 
workplaces and personal effects therein.213  Thus, he advocated for the 
adoption of a simple reasonableness test, and noted that common 
workplace government searches would meet the test.214   
Although the plurality and concurrence disagreed as to the 
mechanics of the standard, both appeared to agree on basic principles.  
The ultimate question is whether a search is reasonable within its 
parameters.  And the government acting as an employer is subject to 
different standards of reasonableness than the government acting as 
law enforcement.215  Thus, under either standard there is no need for a 
warrant or probable cause, even if the search is designed to locate 
evidence of suspected work-related employee misfeasance.216  The 
public employer needs the discretion to act as private employers do in 
conducting their business.217  This determination is not without critics, 
starting with the four dissenters in the case.218  It shows that the 
Court focused its mindset more on the milieu of the everyday 
workplace, rather than the government’s power to search and seize. 
The Roberts Court has continued to analyze public employee 
privacy protections using Ortega’s flexible standards.  The question in 
City of Ontario v. Quon,219 as it was in Ortega, is whether the public 
employer had violated its employee’s Fourth Amendment right against 
                                                          
213 Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would hold, therefore, that 
the offices of government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those 
offices, are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.”). 
214 See also id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The government, like 
any other employer, needs frequent and convenient access to its desks, offices, and 
file cabinets for work-related purposes. I would hold that government searches to 
retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules—
searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-
employer context—do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
215 Id. at 717 (plurality opinion) (“The operational realities of the workplace, however, 
may make some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion 
is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.”); id. at 732 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that “the government's status as employer, 
and the employment-related character of the search, become relevant” when 
considering the reasonableness of the search).  See also Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of 
Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (making this point). 
216 Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).   
217 Id. at 723-25 (plurality opinion); id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
218 Id. at 741-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no special need to 
dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements of reasonableness). 
219 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010). 
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unreasonable searches.  However, Quon involved a “location” with 
more uncertain privacy protections: an employer’s text messaging 
system.  The system in question was run by the City of Ontario’s police 
department to allow its officers to communicate with one another.220  
The department provided the officers with pagers, and the messages 
were transmitted over a private company’s wireless service pursuant 
to a contract between the company and the city.  The City’s privacy 
policy reserved to the City the right to monitor the system, but a 
supervisor within the department also indicated that the texts would 
not be audited if employees paid for any additional expense incurred if 
the employee went over the character amount.221  After a set of 
employees consistently went over the character limits over several 
months, the chief of police decided to conduct an audit to determine 
whether the limits were too low for work-related purposes.  The audit 
determined that in fact the employees were using the messaging 
system primarily for personal purposes, and that some of the texts 
were sexually explicit.  As a result of the audit, the plaintiff-employee 
was allegedly disciplined.222   
The Court had a number of complicated issues to address in 
Quon.  The immediate concern is how to frame the proper standard: 
would it use the Ortega plurality’s two-step approach, Justice Scalia’s 
reasonableness approach, or a newly created approach?  Within these 
tests, further intricacies lurked.  What sort of privacy expectations do 
employees have in this new electronic environment?  On one level, the 
interest of employees in their personal electronic communications 
resonates with most users of these burgeoning technologies.223  On the 
other hand, the interest of the public in accessing police records also 
appears fairly strong.224  The Court’s opinion would need to address 
these concerns. 
                                                          
220 Id. at 2625 (“The City issued pagers to [plaintiff] and other SWAT Team members 
in order to help the SWAT Team mobilize and respond to emergency situations.”). 
221 Id. The written privacy policy applied to the City’s email system but was applied 
to the text messaging system orally at a staff meeting. 
222 Id. at 2626.   
223 Id. at 2630 (“Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that 
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for 
self-expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an 
expectation of privacy."). 
224 For a discussion of these ramifications, see Brief of Amici Curiae Los Angeles 
Times Communications LLC, The Press-Enterprise Company, The Associated Press, 
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Although the Quon majority does address these concerns, it 
largely avoided answering them.  Instead, it skipped all the way to the 
end to determine that the search was reasonable and therefore 
constitutional.  In getting to this end point, the Court decided not to 
choose the proper standard to use225 or to determine whether the police 
offers had a reasonable expectation of privacy.226  Such diversions were 
not necessary, because ultimately the search itself was justified in its 
inception and reasonable in its scope.  The Court found that the 
Department had a reasonable basis for examining the text messages—
namely, its desire to know whether the text messaging character limit 
was sufficient for the officers’ needs—and found the two-month scope 
of the search to be reasonable as well.227  Because the department 
acted reasonably in conducting the search, said the Court, the search 
was constitutional. 
In jumping ahead to the final doctrinal hurdle to resolve the 
case, the Court arguably chose the weakest link upon which to rest its 
case.  The department had told the officers that it would allow them to 
reimburse it for any text-messaging overages and, if they did so, there 
would be no need to audit the messages themselves.228  The 
department leadership apparently changed its mind, because they had 
become “tired of being bill collectors” and because they were worried 
that the existing character limits were too low.229  Neither of these is 
really a good reason to conduct a search of the contents of the messages 
without notifying the officers ahead of time.  Had the department been 
worried about malfeasance or even misfeasance of some kind, the 
search might have made more sense.  But the two justifications 
provided seem fairly weak, especially when the department could have 
                                                                                                                                                              
The E.W. Scripps Co., The California Newspapers Publishers Association, The 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The First Amendment Coalition and 
Californians Aware in Support of Petitioners , City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 
2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332). 
225 Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2628-29 (“It is not necessary to resolve [which test is correct.]  
The two O’Connor [v. Ortega] approaches—the plurality’s and Justice Scalia’s—
therefore lead to the same result here.”). 
226 Id. at 2630 (assuming arguendo that Quon had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
227 Id. at 2631. 
228 Id. at 2625.   
229 Id. at 2626. 
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simply changed its policy going forward.230  There was no need for 
exigency.  Despite the existence of less intrusive means of searching, 
with seemingly no loss in effectiveness, the Court still found the search 
to be reasonable.  The Court responded to this concern by noting that 
the government need not use the least intrusive methods possible in 
order for the search to be reasonable.231  Instead, the Court gave the 
department wide berth in determining how to conduct its review of the 
text-messaging system.  The Court held: “[A] reasonable employee 
would be aware that sound management principles might require the 
audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being 
appropriately used.”232  Notice what the Court is saying: an employee 
should be reasonable enough to think in terms of “sound management 
principles.” 
Paul Secunda has argued that the Quon opinion continues the 
trend toward the “privatization” of public employee privacy.233  In his 
view, the Court has looked to the private sector in determining the 
proper levels of privacy protections afforded to public employees.234  
Such an approach would be in line with a Court that took a human-
resources perspective.  Employee privacy is a critical workplace issue, 
and much remains uncertain about the extent to which employees can 
fence out employer intrusions within the workplace.  The Supreme 
Court, put into the role of HR manager thanks to the 
constitutionalization of public-employee privacy, opts for a doctrine 
that looks to follow reasonable HR practices.  One can understand why 
the Court would blanche at warrant or probable cause requirements, 
as suggested by commentators like Secunda for certain 
circumstances.235  Such requirements would dramatically depart from 
the modus operandi of the modern workplace. 
                                                          
230 This approach was suggested by the Court of Appeals below.  Quon v. Arch 
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 909 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that there were “a 
host of simple ways to verify the efficacy of the 25,000 character limit . . . without 
intruding on Appellants' Fourth Amendment rights”).. 
231 Quon, 130 S.Ct at 2632. 
232 Id. at 2631. 
233 Secunda, supra note PS2012, at 281. 
234 Id. (“But rather than elevating private-sector privacy rights to the public-sector 
level, Quon suggests that public employee workplace privacy rights should be 
‘privatized’ and reduced to the level of employees in the private sector.”). 
235 Id. at 312-15 (arguing for such requirements for investigatory searches). 
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The Court’s HR-oriented approach to public-employee privacy is 
even more apparent in National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
v. Nelson.236  In that case, contract employees at NASA’s Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory were required to go through background checks 
due to a change in regulatory procedure.237  These employees were 
given a questionnaire to complete, and additional questionnaires were 
sent to the employees’ references and past landlords.238  Employees 
subject to this background check process brought suit, arguing that the 
process infringed upon their rights to informational privacy.239  The 
Ninth Circuit agreed, highlighting two aspects of the investigations 
that were problematic.240  First, the employee questionnaire asked, as 
a follow-up to an initial question about drug use, whether the employee 
had had any treatment or counseling for drug use in the last year.241  
Second, the questionnaire sent to references asked a series of open-
ended questions pertaining to the employees’ honesty, financial 
integrity, drug use, and overall “suitability” for government 
employment.242  The circuit court enjoined these aspects of the 
investigation.243 
 As in Quon, the Supreme Court had serious doctrinal issues to 
tackle in resolving Nelson.  The most important question was whether 
a right to information privacy even existed.  The Court had alluded to 
an interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” in Whalen v. 
Roe244 and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,245 but had 
never established whether a constitutional right existed.  As in Quon, 
however, the Court once again skipped through the preliminaries to 
find that the questionnaires were in fact reasonable.  The Court 
assumed, without deciding, that the constitutional right to information 
                                                          
236 131 S.Ct. 746 (2011). 
237 Id. at 752.  The change was accomplished through a presidential directive.  See 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD -12—Policy for a Common 
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, Public Papers of the 
President, George W. Bush, Vol. 2, Aug. 27, 2007, at 1765, App. 127. 
238 Id. at 752-53. 
239 Id. at 754. 
240 Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 530 F.3d 865, 878-81 (9th Cir. 2008). 
241 Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 759. 
242 Id. at 761. 
243 Nelson, 530 F.3d at 878-81. 
244 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). 
245 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977). 
 
 
ROBERTS COURT AND HUMAN RESOURCES                          46 
 
 
privacy existed.246  Instead, the Court examined whether the 
government’s questions would violate such a right, and it concluded 
that they would not.247  In conducting its review, the Court compared 
the questions at issue to employment practices used in businesses 
across the country.248  In the Court’s view, these questions were “part 
of a standard employment background check of the sort used by 
millions of private employers.”249  Discussing the drug-related 
inquiries, the Court contended that “[l]ike any employer, the 
Government is entitled to have its projects staffed by reliable, law-
abiding persons who will efficiently and effectively discharge their 
duties.”250  Even if the phrasing of the question was potentially more 
intrusive than necessary, the Court rejected any constitutional 
requirement to choose the least restrictive means.251  As for the open-
ended questions for references, the Court looked to both public and 
private HR practices in determining their reasonableness: 
 
The reasonableness of such open-ended questions is 
illustrated by their pervasiveness in the public and 
private sectors. Form 42 alone is sent out by the 
Government over 1.8 million times annually. Ibid. In 
addition, the use of open-ended questions in employment 
background checks appears to be equally commonplace in 
the private sector. See, e.g., S. Bock et al., Mandated 
Benefits 2008 Compliance Guide, Exh. 20.1, A Sample 
Policy on Reference Checks on Job Applicants (“Following 
are the guidelines for conducting a telephone reference 
check: ... Ask open-ended questions, then wait for the 
respondent to answer”); M. Zweig, Human Resources 
Management 87 (1991) (“Also ask, ‘Is there anything else 
I need to know about [candidate's name]?’ This kind of 
                                                          
246 Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 751. 
247 The judgment was unanimous; Justices Scalia and Thomas filed opinions 
concurring in the judgment in which they found no constitutional right to 
information privacy.  See id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 769 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
248 Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 758 (arguing that the government “could not function” if 
every employment decision became a constitutional matter). 
249 Id.  
250 Id. at 759-60 (citations and quotations omitted). 
251 Id. at 760. 
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open-ended question may turn up all kinds of information 
you wouldn't have gotten any other way”). The use of 
similar open-ended questions by the Government is 
reasonable and furthers its interests in managing its 
operations.252 
 
In both Quon and Nelson, the Supreme Court confronted 
weighty constitutional questions about the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections as well as the existence of a right to 
information privacy.  But it moved past both these questions on to 
more comfortable terrain—namely, whether the HR policies and 
practices in question had been reasonable.  Looking to private 
businesses for comparison, the Court found that the public employers 
had acted properly.  These cases provide another set of examples as to 
how the Court addresses employment issues most comfortably from the 
human resources perspective.  
 
D. ERISA 
 
ERISA and HR go hand-in-hand.  Human resources 
departments generally have the responsibility of managing the pension 
and welfare benefits that are governed by ERISA’s protections.  
ERISA’s complexity arguably instigated the growth of HR 
departments, as professional training aids in the understanding of the 
financial, accounting, and legal requirements necessary to provide 
these benefits.  The tax ramifications are sufficiently beneficial to 
induce the creation of health care, pension, and other benefit plans.  
But, as the Court is keen to remind in its opinions, nothing requires 
employers to have these plans. 
ERISA has a unique and somewhat paradoxical structure.  On 
the one hand, employers generally have complete freedom in setting up 
their plan, as well as in modifying a plans contributions or benefits 
across the board.  Once established, however, the plan must be 
administered for the ultimate good of the beneficiaries.  The 
employer—switching hats, as in trust law, from settler to trustee—
must shift from negotiating with its employees to managing the plan in 
their interest.  It is not always clear when the roles change, or what we 
expect from employers in playing these roles. 
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Although most of us would likely look at an ERISA case through 
the eyes of the beneficiary, the Roberts Court has evinced a sympathy 
for the human resources side of the equation.  As the Court makes 
clear, there are doctrinal and instrumental reasons for doing so.  But 
the Roberts Court seems to get the melody of HR, as well as the basic 
notes, and it shows.  Its decisions in this area may have some elements 
of a conservative, pro-business, and/or anti-litigation approach.  
However, once again I believe the most consistent theme is that of 
protection for and empathy towards human resources departments.  
The Court believes that businesses must govern themselves in the 
area, and it wants to provide HR departments with the means and 
independence to do so. 
The foundational Rehnquist Court case for the Roberts Court’s 
ERISA jurisprudence is Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.253   The 
plaintiffs in Firestone had been working for Firestone until their 
workplaces were sold to Occidental Petroleum.254  Plaintiffs believed 
they were entitled to termination pay under the Firestone termination 
pay plan.255  Firestone disagreed and refused to pay out any benefits.  
Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the denial of benefits under ERISA 
§ 1132(a)(1).256  The Court, in a unanimous ruling, held that 
Firestone’s denial had to be reviewed under a de novo standard.257  The 
Court’s opinion reads as a pro-plaintiff opinion, or at least not a pro-
defendant one.  The Court emphasizes the importance of viewing 
ERISA plans as trusts, and thus employees as beneficiaries.258  It 
rejects Firestone’s argument for an arbitrary and capricious standard 
of review, finding that such a “reading of ERISA would require us to 
impose a standard of review that would afford less protection to 
employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was 
enacted.”259  However, the Court’s holding ultimately paved the way 
                                                          
253 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
254 Id. at 105. 
255 This plan, unbeknownst to Firestone at the time, was an ERISA-covered plan.  Id. 
256 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006). 
257 Id. at 115. 
258 Id. at 110 (“ERISA's legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary 
responsibility provisions codify and make applicable to ERISA fiduciaries certain 
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.”) (citations omitted); id. at 
111 (“In determining the appropriate standard of review for actions under § 
1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles of trust law.”) 
259 Id. at 113-14. 
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for employers to do exactly that.  The Court stated: “we hold that a 
denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed 
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the 
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine 
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”260  That 
“unless,” of course, was fairly easy for employers to add to their plans.  
As a result, arbitrary and capricious review is available to any 
employer that wants it. 
 The Court’s opinion in Firestone is somewhat mixed about the 
need to protect employers from judicial oversight.  In the following 
passage, the Court discusses this concern: 
 
Firestone and its amici also assert that a de novo 
standard would contravene the spirit of ERISA because it 
would impose much higher administrative and litigation 
costs and therefore discourage employers from creating 
benefit plans. Because even under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard an employer's denial of benefits could 
be subject to judicial review, the assumption seems to be 
that a de novo standard would encourage more litigation 
by employees, participants, and beneficiaries who wish to 
assert their right to benefits. Neither general principles of 
trust law nor a concern for impartial decisionmaking, 
however, forecloses parties from agreeing upon a 
narrower standard of review. Moreover, as to both funded 
and unfunded plans, the threat of increased litigation is 
not sufficient to outweigh the reasons for a de novo 
standard that we have already explained.261 
 
The Roberts Court has no such ambivalence.  As discussed below, the 
Court has consistently found in favor of greater HR discretion and 
authority.  Sometimes that means cutting back on beneficiaries’ 
litigation rights.  But sometimes, as in the Crawford case, it means 
providing for more relief in order to solidify the private administrative 
structure that the Court is endeavoring to maintain. 
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Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn262 follows in the tradition of 
Firestone as an opinion that looked more pro-plaintiff at the time it 
was written.  At issue in the case is whether there is a conflict of 
interest when an plan administrator is also the payer of benefits and, 
if so, what effect that conflict has.  The majority opinion, written by 
Justice Breyer, found that the roles of decider and payer do, in fact, 
create a conflict of interest in either an employer or an insurance 
company.263  The Court also decided that this conflict of interest is to 
be taken into account as a factor in determining whether to uphold the 
denial of benefits.  However, the Court also left the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of review in place, so that the conflict is only a 
factor as to whether the plan administrator abused its discretion.264  
As a result, the case has become more important for its retention of the 
abuse of discretion standard in the face of a conflict of interest, rather 
than for the fact that it takes that conflict into account in some way. 
 The facts in Metropolitan Life engender a fair amount of 
sympathy.  After being diagnosed with a severe heart condition, 
plaintiff sought to avail herself of disability protections afforded by the 
employer as well as the government.265  The insurance company that 
administered plaintiff’s employer’s plan gave her benefits for the initial 
24 months after she was rendered unable to work.266  It also 
encouraged her to seek social security benefits.267  After she obtained 
those benefits, the insurance company claimed the award as a setoff 
for their plan expenses.268  But it then denied her claim for long-term 
disability benefits, even though the standard was close to the social 
security standard.269 
 Given the insurance company’s duplicitous behavior, as well as 
the inconsistencies in its defense of its decision, the case seems ripe for 
an abuse of discretion finding.  And ultimately, that judgment was 
upheld by the Court.  The larger question, however, is whether the 
responsibility for paying out benefits creates a conflict of interest when 
that party also decides whether to grant benefits.  The Court, in dicta, 
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found a “clear” conflict of interest “where it is the employer that both 
funds the plan and evaluates the claims.”270  Noting that reputational 
concerns might push a private insurance company into better behavior, 
the Court nevertheless found the defendant to have had a conflict of 
interest.  And it held that such a conflict should be taken into account 
when reviewing the decision pursuant to a ERISA claim. 
 The Court’s decision was a favorable one to ERISA plaintiffs in 
some respects, as the concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts and the 
dissent by Justice Scalia make clear.  These jurists would have opted 
for a more limited role for the conflict: Chief Justice Roberts “would 
instead consider the conflict of interest on review only where there is 
evidence that the benefits denial was motivated or affected by the 
administrator's conflict,”271 and Justice Scalia would have held that “a 
fiduciary with a conflict does not abuse its discretion unless the conflict 
actually and improperly motivates the decision.”272  However, the 
decision is still favorable to ERISA administrators in that it maintains 
the abuse of discretion standard.  Changing the standard of review 
would result in “adopting a rule that in practice could bring about near 
universal review by judges de novo—i.e., without deference—of the 
lion’s share of ERISA plan claims denials.”273  Ultimately, the standard 
would be more important than whether an ambiguous conflict-of-
interest “factor” was made part of the abuse of discretion test. 
 The majority opinion is also aware of its effect on HR 
decisionmaking, and it offers a set of suggestions by which ERISA plan 
administrators can reduce the importance of the conflict of interest 
factor.  The Court states: 
 
The conflict of interest at issue here, for example, should 
prove more important (perhaps of great importance) 
where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it 
affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited 
to, cases where an insurance company administrator has 
a history of biased claims administration. . . . It should 
                                                          
270 Id. at 112.  This conclusion drew a harsh critique from Justice Scalia in dissent, 
who argued that “I would not resolve this question until it has been presented and 
argued.”  Id. at 127 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
271 Id. at 120 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
272 Id. at 127-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
273 Metropolitan Life, 554 U.S. at 116. 
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prove less important (perhaps to the vanishing point) 
where the administrator has taken active steps to reduce 
potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by 
walling off claims administrators from those interested in 
firm finances, or by imposing management checks that 
penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective of whom 
the inaccuracy benefits.274  
 
These guidelines are not quite a safe harbor, but the “vanishing point” 
language is suggestive of that.  Ultimately, the Court wants ERISA 
plan administrators to manage their conflicts privately.  Firewalls and 
internal controls are likely to insulate future administrators from 
concerns about their conflicts of interest.  Like the Faragher/Ellerth 
affirmative defense, these suggestions provide a roadmap for 
employers and HR professionals in carrying out their compliance 
responsibilities. 
 Conkright v. Frommert275 continues the development of the law 
regarding the review of ERISA benefit determinations.  This is no 
small matter: an estimated 1.9 million beneficiaries have claims denied 
each year.276  It is in Conkright that the ramifications of Firestone and 
Metropolitan Life become clear.  The “abuse of discretion” standard, 
which Firestone made available and Metropolitan Life kept in place, 
becomes the centerpiece of the Court’s deference toward plan 
administrators.277  That deference is to be kept in place even when the 
administrator has already demonstrated a flawed understanding of the 
plan and has used that understanding to harm beneficiaries. 
The facts of Conkright are “exceedingly complicated,” according 
to the Court, “[a]s in many ERISA matters.”278  The plaintiffs were 
Xerox employees who left the company in the 1980’s, received lump-
sum distributions of retirement benefits, and were later rehired.  The 
dispute involved how the pension plan accounted for that lump sum 
                                                          
274 Id. at 117 (citations omitted). 
275 130 S.Ct. 1640 (2010). 
276 Metropolitan Life, 554 U.S. at 116 (citing C. GRESENZ ET AL., A FLOOD OF 
LITIGATION? 8 (1999), at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP184.pdf )). 
277 Conkright, 130 S.Ct. at 1646 (“We expanded Firestone's approach in Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn . . . . We held that, when the terms of a plan grant discretionary 
authority to the plan administrator, a deferential standard of review remains 
appropriate even in the face of a conflict. 
278 Conkright, 130 S.Ct. at 1644. 
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distribution in calculating the plaintiffs’ benefits after they were 
rehired.  The plan administrator created “phantom accounts” whereby 
it calculated the hypothetical growth that the lump-sum distributions 
would have experienced if they had stayed in the plans.  The plaintiffs’ 
pension benefits were then reduced by that amount.279  Plaintiffs 
challenged this method of calculation, and the Court of Appeals 
ultimately found the method to be unreasonable.  On remand, the plan 
administrator submitted an affidavit with another method of 
calculating the benefits.  The district court did not give this suggestion 
any deference, and it instead developed its own method of calculating 
the impact of the lump-sum distributions on future benefits. 
The complexity of the facts obscures the equities of the case.  In 
the majority’s telling, the plan administrator appears to be a good faith 
actor, coming up with legitimate approaches that are ultimately 
ignored by the district court.  And not only does the district court 
fashion its own approach, but its approach did not account for the 
time-value of money, instead reducing the plans by the nominal 
amount of the distributions.280  However, the dissent paints the 
“phantom account” approach as much more unreasonable.  In an 
appendix to the opinion, the dissent explains how workers subject to 
the phantom account make significantly less than if they had simply 
been treated as new hires upon their return to Xerox.281  Perhaps more 
damningly, the plan administrator never notified employees about the 
phantom account method, other than vague language mentioning an 
“offset” to their pensions.282  Given the complexity of the decisions 
being made, this lack of notification is not reassuring as to the 
administrator’s competence or good faith. 
The majority opinion does not spend as much time on the facts 
as the dissent, nor does it mention the administrator’s failure to notify 
beneficiaries about the phantom account method.  Instead, it focuses 
on the need for deference to plan administrators, even in light of error.  
In fact, the majority is remarkably empathetic to the administrators, 
as the opening of the opinion makes clear: 
                                                          
279 Id. at 1645. 
280 Id. at 1645. 
281 Id. at 1661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (appendix) (explaining how a hypothetical 
employee would get $690 per year upon his return to Xerox using the phantom 
account method, while a new employee would get at least $3,500 annually). 
282 Id. at 1653-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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People make mistakes. Even administrators of ERISA 
plans. That should come as no surprise, given that the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is an 
enormously complex and detailed statute, and the plans 
that administrators must construe can be lengthy and 
complicated. (The one at issue here runs to 81 pages, with 
139 sections.) We held in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch that an ERISA plan administrator with 
discretionary authority to interpret a plan is entitled to 
deference in exercising that discretion. The question here 
is whether a single honest mistake in plan interpretation 
justifies stripping the administrator of that deference for 
subsequent related interpretations of the plan. We hold 
that it does not.283 
 
The focus on “mistake” here is critical: it is not as if the administrator 
intentionally tried to misread the plan and deny benefits to employees.  
A “single honest mistake,” the Court reasons, seems fairly excusable 
and understandable. 
 The Court is setting up a picture of plan administrators as 
neutral arbiters who act in good faith and have the interests of 
beneficiaries at heart.  And before we dismiss such a view as naïve or 
even disingenuous, it is worthwhile to linger on the Court’s vision.  As 
the Court points out, “Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that 
employees would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress 
did not require employers to establish benefit plans in the first 
place.”284  Enforcement of employees’ rights must be balanced against 
“the encouragement of the creation of such plans.”285  Part of the 
encouragement, it would seem, is a great deal of deference to the 
administrator in interpreting the plan.  ERISA plans are not 
interpreted like contracts, in which the intent of the parties is parsed 
through the written and oral manifestations of their agreement.  
Instead, one side is given deference in its interpretation of the contract.  
To counterbalance this deference, the administrator is expected to act 
like a trustee, rather than a party to a contract. 
                                                          
283Conkright, 130 S.Ct. at 1644 (citations and quotations omitted). 
284 Id. at 1648. 
285 Id. at 1649. 
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 This second part of the equation has always seemed a bit 
untenable, or at least unnatural, and the Court evinces some desire to 
move beyond it.  The majority and the dissent spar over how trust law 
should shape the level of deference afforded to the administrator after 
an erroneous interpretation of the plan.  The majority claims that trust 
law is “unclear” on the issue, but cites to a set of fairly aged cases to 
support the possibility of deference.286  The dissent, on the other hand, 
claims the law clearly does not require deference after an abuse of 
discretion, and it cites to the Restatement of Trusts and two treatises 
for support and then deconstructs the majority’s cases.287  The majority 
seems to acknowledge the flaws in its doctrinal argument by stating: 
“While we are guided by principles of trust law in ERISA cases, we 
have recognized before that trust law does not tell the entire story.  
Here trust law does not resolve the specific issue before us, but the 
guiding principles we have identified underlying ERISA do.”288  And it 
is in its description of the “guiding principles . . . underlying ERISA” 
that the Court’s attachment to human resources comes through. 
 The Court cites to the values of efficiency, predictability, and 
uniformity as the core principles in its exegesis of ERISA.  Deference to 
the administrator’s interpretation promotes efficiency “by encouraging 
resolution of benefits disputes through internal administrative 
proceedings rather than costly litigation.”289 Such deference also 
provides predictability, as “an employer can rely on the expertise of the 
plan administrator rather than worry about unexpected and 
inaccurate plan interpretations that might result from de novo judicial 
review.”290 Finally, deference encourages uniformity by “helping to 
avoid a patchwork of different interpretations of a plan, like the one 
here, that covers employees in different jurisdictions-a result that 
would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program 
operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to 
reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting 
                                                          
286 Id. at 1647-48 (citing to  Hanford v. Clancy, 87 N.H. 458, 461, 183 A. 271, 272-273 
(1936); In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 40-41, 12 N.W.2d 148, 150-151 (1943); 
Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 218-219, 132 A. 10, 11 (1926); In re Marre's Estate, 18 
Cal.2d 184, 190, 114 P.2d 586, 590-591 (1941); and Finch v. Wachovia Bank & Trust 
Co., 156 N.C.App. 343, 348, 577 S.E.2d 306, 310 (2003)). 
287 Id. at 1655-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
288 Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1648. 
289 Id. at 1649. 
290 Id.  
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them.”291  The Court pointed to the district court’s ruling in Conkright 
as an example of what could happen if deference were not afforded.  
The lower court settled on an interpretation that did not account for 
the time value of money, was different that interpretations of the same 
plan in other circuits, and fomented continued litigation.292  Deference, 
on the other hand, would leave the plan’s reins in the hands of the 
administrator, absent bad faith or severe incompetence.293 
 Conkright illuminates the Court’s core premise that runs, 
somewhat hidden, through Firestone and Metropolitan Life: namely, 
administrators must be given deference.  This deference could be 
characterized as conservative, pro-business, and anti-litigation.  But it 
can also be characterized as pro-human resources.  That is ultimately 
where the Court’s concern seems to reside. 
 Finally, both Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.294 and 
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.295 are minor cases, 
unanimous in their judgment, in which the Court attended to the edges 
of ERISA’s regulatory scheme.  In Hardt, the plaintiff brought an 
ERISA action against her plan administrator for the administrator’s 
long-term disability benefits. The district court dismissed both sides’ 
motions for summary judgment, but the court also indicated that it 
was “inclined to rule” in favor of the plaintiff and gave the 
administrator thirty days to reconsider its decision.296  After the 
administrator changed its decision, plaintiff petitioned the court for 
attorney’s fees.  The Supreme Court held that under ERISA’s attorneys 
fees provision, the fee claimant need not be prevailing party to be 
eligible for attorney fees under ERISA's general fee-shifting statute.  
Instead, the claimant must show some degree of success on merits 
before court may award attorney fees under ERISA's general fee-
shifting statute.  In LaRue, an employee had sued his former employer 
alleging that it had not properly followed his instructions as to his § 
401(k) retirement savings plan.297  The lower courts dismissed the 
                                                          
291 Id.  
292 Id. at 1649-51. 
293 Id. at 1651 (“Multiple erroneous interpretations of the same plan provision, even if 
issued in good faith, might well support a finding that a plan administrator is too 
incompetent to exercise his discretion fairly . . . .”). 
294 130 S.Ct. 2149 (2010). 
295 552 U.S. 248 (2008). 
296 Hardt, 130 S.Ct. at 2154. 
297 LaRue, 552 U.S. at 251. 
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claim, asserting that beneficiaries are only entitled to sue for damages 
as to the “entire plan.”  The Court reversed, holding that a § 401(k) 
account should be treated as an “entire plan” and therefore the 
plaintiff was entitled to damages. 
 We should not make too much of these cases.  But in both 
situations, the Court overturned a court of appeals’ decision and ruled 
in favor of the plaintiff.  To that extent, they represent 
counterexamples to the arguments that the Roberts Court is simply 
conservative, pro-business, or anti-litigation.  More importantly, they 
represent human resources values as well.  Hardt reflects the desire to 
award parties who succeed, without requiring the technicality of a 
formal judgment (and thus further litigation).  LaRue shows that the 
Court understands the new dynamics of pension plans, which favor 
defined contribution plans over defined benefit plans.  By attending to 
minor ERISA issues with care and a concern for the underlying 
process, the Court demonstrates its care and concern for ERISA and 
the activities that it regulates. 
III. THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE HUMAN RESOURCES REVOLUTION 
 
 In The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice,298 William 
Stuntz blamed the constitutionalization of criminal procedure for our 
dysfunctional criminal law.  According to Stuntz, “[c]urrent 
constitutional law makes the politics of criminal justice worse: more 
punitive, more racist, and less protective of individual liberty.”299  This 
counterintuitive result, claimed Stuntz, stemmed from the political 
economy of the criminal justice system.  Legislators and agencies only 
want to spend in areas where they can also exercise control.  While the 
Court has extensively regulated policing and the trial process through 
constitutional interpretation, it has left substantive criminal law and 
sentencing largely free from oversight.300  As a result, legislators have 
                                                          
298 Stuntz,  supra note WJS2006. 
299 Id. at 785.  See also id at 784 (“There is no way to run a test, but it seems likely 
that because of the constitutional rules that govern policing and trial procedure, 
criminal law is broader, sentencing rules are harsher, key criminal justice 
institutions are more underfunded, and the population of arrestees and defendants is 
more racially skewed than would otherwise be the case.”) 
300 Id. at 782.  Stuntz acknowledged that regulation of sentencing has increased in 
the last few years. Id.   
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focused their attention and spending in defining new crimes and 
meting out punishment.  In order to remedy this state of affairs, 
Stuntz argued, the Court should roll back its criminal procedure 
regulation in order to let states take more control.301  It should instead 
focus on limited areas of constitutional concern that are likely to fester, 
and allow states to experiment with different solutions in all areas of 
the criminal justice system.302  Speaking more directly to progressive 
criminal law scholars, Eric Miller has also called for a reconsideration 
of the Warren Court’s criminal cases.303  According to Miller, the 
traditional interpretation of the Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence has focused too much on rights, and not enough on the 
regulation of police that such jurisprudence entailed.304  Instead of 
focusing on rights, progressives needed to focus on the regulation of 
law enforcement officers.  Reconceiving the constitutional oversight of 
justice as an endeavor in republican governance, rather than a right-
based scheme, would help reorient our perception to what really 
matters in everyday criminal justice: namely, the cops.305 
 Just as the political economy of criminal law has focused on 
constitutional rights, the political economy of employment law has 
focused almost exclusively on employee legal rights and the litigation 
that enforces them.  The action in the employment law arena centers 
around statutory rights that are enforced by private rights of action.  
The gravamen behind these rights is the concern about employer 
abuses of power, whether it be discriminating against certain kinds of 
employees, paying low wages, failing to provide for promised benefits, 
or preventing employees from taking sick or parental leave.  However, 
the relationship between employer and employer is not solely 
oppositional; we need employers to employ us.  In this way, just as we 
need governments to provide us with security against crime, we need 
employers to provide us with work and wages.  In order to carry out 
their responsibilities, both governments and employers need power, 
authority, and flexibility.  But we worry about them abusing their 
power.  As a result, we have constructed rights-based regimes to 
protect those who suffer from abuses of power.  In the criminal context, 
                                                          
301 Id. at 832-33. 
302 Id. at 831-50. 
303 Miller, supra note EJM2010, at 3-5. 
304 Id.  at 5-6. 
305 Id. at 76-80. 
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we have constitutional rights that protect individuals against abuses 
such as unreasonable searches and seizures.  In the employment 
context, we have statutory rights as to hiring, firing, and other 
employment actions that protect individuals against abuses such as 
discriminatory terminations.  These rights provide the oversight of the 
powerful institutions in question, and they provide remedies if an 
individual suffers abuse. 
 In both contexts, however, legal academia’s focus on rights has 
arguably obscured the bigger picture.  As Stuntz and Miller argue, the 
focus on constitutional rights has constricted legislative and executive 
efforts to improve the overall functioning of the system.306  It has 
frozen certain aspects of criminal procedure in constitutional amber, 
and has left legislators to run amuck in other areas unfettered.  We 
need to take a step back and look at the larger picture, they argue, 
particularly when it comes to the regulation of police.  Miller 
contended that the Warren Court’s “rights revolution” was actually all 
about regulation, and that a focus on rights has missed the real point 
of the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence.307  Rather than 
creating rights, the Court was instead introducing a (federal) 
regulatory regime into the realm of (state and local) policing.  This 
regulatory regime has been overlooked by commentators in their focus 
on the contours of individual rights.  Miller argued: 
 
The central problem with left-liberal theories of policing is 
that they are too negative, providing no real account of 
good policing practices. Left-liberals are no more than 
minimally interested in the process of criminal 
investigation, because police investigation undermines 
immunity from state coercion. Instead, left-liberals focus 
on tightly restricting police discretion, which is usually 
characterized as, at most, one step away from race or 
class discrimination. Lacking a positive theory of policing, 
left-liberals surrender the discussion of police practices to 
centrists and conservatives. Left-liberals are left on the 
fringes seeking to reduce policing as a means of 
combating state repression.308 
                                                          
306 Stuntz, supra note WJS2006, at 832; Miller, supra note EJM2010, at 3-5. 
307 Id. at 4-5. 
308 Id. at 76-77. 
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Stuntz makes a similar claim.  He argues that cops have been woefully 
underappreciated by legal academics in their efforts to improve the 
criminal justice system.  He points to President Clinton’s “100,000 cops 
on the street” legislation as the one truly successful recent criminal 
justice initiative,309  and he rues the lack of a federal “No Cop Left 
Behind” program.310  Stuntz’s prescription is radical: “the best thing to 
do with the massive body of Fourth Amendment privacy regulation, 
together with the equally massive body of law on the scope and limits 
of the exclusionary rule, is to wipe it off the books.”311  In exchange, the 
federal government should continue along the “100,000 cops” path to 
reinvigorate its relationship with local law enforcement.312  In other 
words: it’s about the cops, stupid. 
 Who are the cops when it comes to the workplace?  Human 
resources.313  Human resources departments implement the employer’s 
policies when it comes to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, 
benefits, and work environment.  Just as the police wield the authority 
in the criminal procedure context at the grass roots level, human 
resources employees wield workplace authority on the shop floor.  They 
make the particularized decisions—millions every day—that can lead 
to abuse and discrimination.  And like the police, they can be 
demonized based on those abuses.  But concern about that abuse 
overshadows their importance to the functioning of business and 
industry.  More importantly, it neglects an opportunity.  HR 
departments are there, at least in part, to make sure that the employer 
complies with labor and employment law.  They are natural allies in 
the effort to fight workplace abuse and discrimination.  Rather than 
seeing them as part of the problem, it is time to consider how they can 
be part of the solution. 
 Of course, human resources professionals, like police officers, 
can engage in both misfeasance and malfeasance on behalf of their 
organizations.  Critics of a compliance-based approach to employment 
                                                          
309 Stuntz, supra note WJS2006, at 810-11, 846 (noting it was combined with the 
enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which provides for broad injunctive relief against 
police departments if a pattern of constitutional violations are established). 
310 Id. at 808-09. 
311 Id. at 832. 
312 Id. at 846. 
313 LAZEAR, supra note ED1998, at 1 (“[Human resources professionals] are viewed as 
company police whose role is to create hassles for others in the firm.”). 
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law argue that HR departments are often deployed as managerial 
tools, rather than independent monitors.314   A common thread of these 
critiques is that HR programs may only serve as window dressing, or 
may even hide existing discrimination behind particularly thick 
curtains.315  Under such circumstances, HR departments are part of 
the problem, rather than part of the solution, as they allow employers 
(and courts) to appear as if they are addressing workplace injustices, 
when in fact the problems are only submerged beneath a more 
palatable exterior.  HR may also make it harder for the employee to 
sue successfully, either by delaying the claim or creating a plausible 
paper trail for an innocent explanation.316 
                                                          
314 See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance: Understanding 
Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 5-7 
(1999) (discussing employer compliance programs as, at least in part, “litigation 
prevention strategies”); Grossman, supra note JLG2003, at 3-5 (expressing the 
concern that compliance regimes could ultimately leave the level of workplace sexual 
harassment unaffected). 
315 See Bisom-Rapp, supra note SBRFSU, at 964 (describing “how certain compliance 
mechanisms, specifically those recommended by defense attorneys, may obscure 
conditions of inequality”); Grossman, supra note JLG2003, at 3 (criticizing the 
Faragher/Ellerth approach for “a misguided culture of compliance, one in which 
liability is measured not by whether employers successfully prevent harassment, but 
instead whether they comply with judicially created prophylactic rules”). 
316 For example, Brake and Grossman argue: 
The past decade's surge of employer policies and procedures for 
resolving discrimination complaints internally plays an important 
role in contributing to the problems we identify. The channeling of 
discrimination complaints into internal employer processes intersects 
with both ends of the doctrine: the timely filing rules and the 
retaliation protections. By failing to toll the limitations period on 
formal remedies, participation in internal grievance processes can 
run out the clock on an unsuspecting employee's formal assertion of 
rights. In addition, because employer nondiscrimination policies 
shape employees' beliefs about the scope of discrimination law, and 
because participation in such processes falls under Title VII's 
opposition clause instead of its more generous participation clause, 
employees who participate in such processes may find themselves 
without protection from retaliation if their perception of unlawful 
discrimination turns out to be false. Supporters of an expanded role 
for such internal processes have failed to consider the full costs of 
such measures, at least under existing doctrine. In the current Title 
VII rights-claiming framework, such measures risk supplanting, not 
merely supplementing, Title VII's formal mechanisms for protecting 
substantive rights. 
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 Suspicion of HR departments is natural and likely healthy.  
However, dismissal of such departments is a luxury that reformers 
cannot afford.  The potential to exercise rights and obtain relief is 
critical to a toothy system of workplace justice.  But given the low 
numbers of workers who formally exercise those rights within the 
judicial system,317 it makes sense to consider ways to protect 
employees through internal means.  A recent trend in the theory of 
workplace regulation is self-governance or “new” governance.318  New 
governance argues for greater cooperation between government 
officials, employer, and (sometimes) watchdog groups in seeking to 
leverage enforcement resources across a broader range of activity.  
These efforts, in a variety of fields, offer new methods for making sure 
that employers are following the law.  It is puzzling that in the midst 
of the new governance discussions, human resources professionals 
have been largely neglected. 
Although HR may be dismissed as simply an arm of 
management, the field has an independent tradition as a profession 
and an academic field of study.  Scholarship on human resources has 
established large bodies of research on diversity programs,319 testing 
procedures,320 compensation mechanisms,321 and employee 
participation.322  The history of human resources has many instances 
                                                                                                                                                              
Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As A 
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317 See Grossman, supra note JLG2003, at 51-52 (discussing why employees often 
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318 ESTLUND, supra note CE2010; Lobel, supra note OL2004. 
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1995); Michael P. Leiter, Engagement at Work: Issues for Measurement and 
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in which HR professionals sought to improve the company’s treatment 
of its workers and sought to adapt their businesses to changes in laws 
and social norms.323 By working on the front lines, HR professionals 
have the most direct impact on the day-to-day compliance of the 
corporation.324 Even skeptics recognize that HR can deliver important 
changes to workplace policies and culture—changes that may prevent 
wrongs from happening in the first place.325   
How do we reconcile the potential benefits from HR with the 
potential hazards?  To some extent, we cannot.  HR must work with 
management to make the company profitable, but at the same time 
must be able to restrain management in order to secure legal 
compliance and promote investments in human capital.326 These polar 
attractions—the pull of management on one side, and legal and 
professional obligations on the other—are often found in the 
professions.327  There are particularly exacerbated in a youthful, less 
traditional profession such as human resources. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Intervention, in THE HUMAN RESOURCES REVOLUTION: WHY PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST 
MATTERS 213 (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2006). 
323 See Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 147 (arguing that human resources have found 
themselves “in relatively powerful positions” when outside forces such as labor 
shortages or new laws create uncertainty in the external environment); Bisom-Rapp, 
supra note SBREREP, at 9-10 (“Responding opportunistically to the changing legal 
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must upgrade personnel procedures.”). 
324 See CHERRINGTON, supra note DJC1995, at 8-11 (discussing the relationship 
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HR functions). 
325 See Bisom-Rapp, supra note SBREREP, at 11 (discussing research that the formal 
promotion mechanisms improved managerial perspectives on disadvantaged groups); 
Grossman, supra note JLG, at 49 (discussing antiharassment training as “a 
worthwhile subject of study and probably a worthwhile pursuit for employers”). 
326 See Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 148 (discussing the “ambiguous role” played by 
HR within a company).   
327 Many commentators raised serious concerns over the roles of professional 
gatekeepers in the wake of the Enron collapse.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 
B.U. L. Rev. 301, 302 (2004) (“Securities markets have long employed 
“gatekeepers”—independent professionals who pledge their reputational capital—to 
protect the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action. . . 
. But during the late 1990s, these protections seemingly failed, and a unique 
concentration of financial scandals followed, all involving the common denominator of 
accounting irregularities.”). 
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The Supreme Court’s opinions in this area, as we have explored, 
display a solicitousness toward the human resources perspective on 
these workplace issues.  Like HR more generally, this perspective is 
aligned with management.  However, the Court has also recognized 
that for HR to be a viable entity within the firm, it must have its own 
center of gravity.  Thus, the Court has been particularly protective of 
retaliation claims, since such claims strike at the root of the HR 
process.  Similarly, in Ricci, the Court pushed for the HR professionals 
to stick to their guns, even when management wanted the flexibility to 
depart from the test.328  The Supreme Court has thus shown a 
willingness to promote HR ideals, rather than just managerial 
interests.  This aspect of the Court’s employment law jurisprudence is 
underappreciated.   
Just as Miller has argued that progressive criminal law scholars 
need a positive theory of policing,329 I would argue that progressive 
employment law academics and litigators need a positive theory of 
human resources.  Such a theory would seek to mobilize a workforce 
almost a million strong to ensure not only that employers are following 
the law, but that workers are empowered to achieve their fullest 
potential.  Fortunately, we need not start from scratch.  Many human 
resources academics have attempted to push the field more in the 
direction of employees330 or more in the direction of a ethics-based 
practice.331  The ultimate question for the field of human resources will 
be: does it have a primary commitment to management control and 
discretion over personnel matters, or does it have a primary 
commitment to the profession and its ethics?  Legal scholars and 
practitioners will continue to play an important role in this debate. 
 
                                                          
328 See Part II.A supra. 
329 Miller, supra note EM1, at 76-77. 
330 See, e.g., Graham & Tarbell, supra note GT2006 (advocating for a more employee-
oriented approach to human resources). 
331 The Society for Human Resources Management has a Code of Ethics that 
recognizes “As human resource professionals, we are ethically responsible for 
promoting and fostering fairness and justice for all employees and their 
organizations.”  However, the Code also states: “As HR professionals, we are 
responsible for adding value to the organizations we serve and contributing to the 
ethical success of those organizations.”  See SHRM Code of Ethics, at: 
http://www.shrm.org/about/Pages/code-of-ethics.aspx. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The Roberts Court is only seven years old, but if past history is 
any guide, its impact on the law has only just begun.  In the area of 
employment law, the Court has evinced an interest in and sympathy 
towards those workers who toil in the fields of human relations.  
Rather than writing off this effort as simply conservative or pro-
business or anti-litigation, commentators and advocates should 
reconsider the place of human resources departments in the ecosystem 
of the workplace.  The opportunity is there to engage with these 
employees and harness their industry and efficiency for positive 
purposes.  We should join the Court in these efforts. 
